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The business sector in developing countries relies on extemal
funding for about half of its investment. If the availability of in-
vestable funds is to be freed from its dependence on the vagaries
of the international capital markets, developing country finan-
cial systems will have to attract more household savings with
new types of instruments and adequate returns.
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A review of flow of funds data for 17 develop-  channeled from the household to the business
ing countries reveals that most years in most  sector much more by means of bank deposits
countries:  and loans than through issue of equities.
- The household sector is a net lender,  The foreign sectr.r cannot be relied upon as a
lending on average 7 percent of GNP - and  passive or residual provider of funds to the do-
more in countries that are more open and have  mestic economy. A shortfall in foreign financ-
higher income. The household sector typically  ing or an increase in govermment  borrowing
saves more than twice what it needs to finance  typically force the business sector to reduce its
its accumulation of real assets, lending the rest  investment.  Households and the government
to other sectors.  typically do little to absorb foreign financing
shocks by adjusting their net lending.
* The business sector is a net borrower,
bonrowing  on average 7 percent of GNP.  About  The vulnerability of the business sector to
half of real capital formation by business is  the availability of foreign funds points up the
extemally financed.  need for the financial sector in developing
countries to find more ways to attract domestic
* The government sector is sometimes a net  savings to finance worthwhile investment
lender but more often a net borrower.  projects. This will require that savers are
ensured a fair share of the retums on investment
Intersectoral flows in developing countries  projects - which means realistic interest rates
are achieved mostly through the banking system.  for savers and the development of financial
The rest of the financial system is typically  instruments that allow savers to share in high-
relatively underdeveloped. Thus savings are  risk high-yield projects.
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Gerhard  Pohl for  comments  on earlier  drafts.INTERSECTORAL  FINANCIAL  FLOWS  IN  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
1  INTRODUCTION
This  paper  is about  financial  flows  in  developing  countries. It  reviews  the
evidence  on  who are  the  borrowers,  who the  lenders. It asks  questions  such
as:  to what  extent  is the  financing  of  business  investment  dependent  on the
availability  of foreign  funds? Does  the  degree  to  which  households
accumulate  financial  assets  vary  according  to the  state  of development  of  the
economy  or according  to availability  of foreign  sources  of finance? What
kinds  of assetr  characterize  financial  intermediation?
Quantitative  information  exists  on these  matter&,  for  many  developing
countries,  though  the  coverage  is  uneven,  and  much  remains  unknown. The
present  exercise  is  an attempt  to  draw  on information  from  some  of the  best
documented  countries.
Apart  from  collecting  and  summarising  available  data from  some  seventeen
countries  the  paper  presents  the  results  of  an econometric  analysis  of the
interactions  between  the  net lending  behavior  of the  different  sectors. The
main  conclusions  of this  analysis  are  as follows:
- The  business  sector,  though  it finances  a substantial  proportion  of its
own  investment  needs  from  savings,  also  relies  heavily  on external
finarncing.  This  reliance  varies  widely,  but a typical  figure  would  be 50
per  cent  of investment.  The  household  sector  is  a net  supplier  of funds.
- Intersectoral  financial  flows  in  developing  countries  are  achieved  to  a
notable  extent  through  the  banking  system. The  remainder  of the
financial  system  is typically  relatively  underdeveloped.  To the  extent
that  the  domestic  financial  system  is  not  able  to intermediate  funds  with
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sufficient  efficiency  to ensure  that  worthwhile  investment  projects  are
financed  out  of domestic  savings,  the  economy  must look  to  foreign
sources  of financing.
- In  a world  of perfectly  functioning  international  capital  markets  such
sources  would  be readily  forthcoming.  But  our  analysis  suggests  that  the
foreign  sector  does  not  smoothly  provide  needed  financing.  A more
realistic  description  would  be to say  that  foreign  sector  financing  is
determined  by factors  other  than  domestic  net  financing  needs.
Furthermore,  a shortfall  in  foreign  finance,  or an increase  in  government
borrowing,  typically  forces  the  business  sector  to reduce  its  investment.
On average,  households  and  the  government  do little  to absorb  external
financing  shocks  by adjusting  their  net  lending.
=  The  vulnerability  of the  business  sector  to the  availability  of
external  funds  points  to the  need for  improvements  in the  effectiveness
with  which  the  financial  sector  in  developing  countries  can  attract
domestic  savings  in order  to finance  worthwhile  investment  projects.
This  will  require  that  savers  are  assured  of a fair  share  of the  returns
to investment  projects. This in turn  requires  realistic  interest  rates
for  savers  as  well as the  developmenat  of instruments  which  can  allow
savers  to  share  in  high-risk  high-yield  projects.
The  paper  is  organized  as follows. Section  2 clarifies  some  terms  and  in
particular  explains  what a complete  set  of flow  of funds  accounts  looks  like.
Some  of the  serious  data  pitfalls  which  exist  are  noted.
Section  3  provides  an analytical  framework  for  the  consideration  of flow  of
funds  data.  (The  reader  who is  mainly  interested  in the  quantitative
findings  may  proceed  directly  to  Section  4.)  Some  theoretical  propositions
concerning  the interaction  between  the  savings  and  surpluses  of  different
2sectors  in  an idealized  economy  are  reviewed  (in  Section  3.2). The  obstacles
to  an efficient  intersectoral  flow  of funds  may  be traced  to  shortcomings  in
the  development  of certain  financial  markets  and  instruments.  Some  of these
shortcomings,  such  as those  resulting  from  interest  rate  controls,  have been
widely  discussed. Others,  familiar  from  the  modern  theory  of finance,  have
not  been so  much  discussed  in  the  developing  country  context  though  they  will
become  increasingly  relevant  as developing  country  financial  systems  become
more  sophisticated.  It is  these  points  which  are  discussed  in  Section  3.3.
Section  4 reports  the  main  data  on sectoral  surpluses  and  deficits  and
summarizes  the  empirical  findings  on their  mutual  interaction  and  on their
determinants.
Section  5  describes  the  typical  pattern  in  developing  countries  of financial
flows  by instrument.
Section  6 is  a summary  and  conclusion.
32  FLOW  OF FUNDS  DATA
2.1  The  elements  of the  flow  of funds.
The  1968  United  Nations  System  of National  Accounts  (SNA) 1 provides  a
statistical  framework  for  presenting  flow  of funds  accounts. The two  main
accounts  of the  SNA  that  are  relevant  for  our  purpose  are  together  referred
to as flow  of funds  accounts. The  caRital  accumulation  account  shows,  for
each  sector,  the  saving  of that  sector  including  provision  for  capital
consumption  (or  depreciation),  any  capital  transfers  to the  sector,
together  with the  non-financial  assets  accumulated  by the  sector,  whether
through  capital  formation,  land  acquisition  and  purchase  of intangible
assets. A balancing  item  of this  account  is  net lending,  the  breakdown  of
which  is the  subject  of the  other  account,  namely  the  caoital  finance
account..
For  only  a  handful  of  developing  countries  are  data  for  these  two  accounts
collected. Even  where  data  exist,  they  are  generally  incomplete  in  certain
respects. An exception  is  Korea,  which  has  detailed  statistics  presented,
generally  speaking,  in the  SNA  format  and  going  back a  number  of years.
Tables  1, 2 and  3 display  the  Korean  flow  of funds  data  for  1984,  together
with the  corresponding  stocks. A review  of  this  data  set  will serve  to
illustrate  many  of the  characteristics  of the  flow  of funds  found  in
diverse  countries,  as  well as allowing  us to fix  some  conceptual  ideas.
Table  1, the  capital  accumulation  account,  represents  the  transition
between  the  national  income  accounts  concepts  of savings  and  capital
formation,  and  the  financial  accounts  concept  of net  surplus  or  :.et
1  United  Nations,  1968,  A  Svstem  of National  Accounts,  (Department  of
Economic  and  Social  Affairs-,  Statistical  Office  of the  United  Nations,  New
York),  Studies  in  Methods,  Series  F,  No. 2.  A revised  methodology  for  the
SNA  is in  preparation.
4TABLE 1:  XOREA,  CAPITAL  ACCUMULATION  ACCOUNT.  1984
Billions  of  won  Households  Business  Government  Financial  Institutions
Accun.  Finance  Accun.  Finance  AcctIn.  Finance  Accux.  Finance
Saving  (net)  7237.0  1800.0  4539.0  474.4
Consumption  of  fixed  capital  896.4  4890.4  143.7  139.7
Capital  transfers  (net)  122.5  143.3  -390.2  124.4
Gross  fixed  capital  formation  4562.9  12657.8  3179.8  394.5
Increase  in  stocks  139.0  243.3
Purchases  of  land*  -1010.6  872.9  -16.2  153.9
Purchases  of  intangible  assets*  -- '.8  60  . 0.3  21.1
Net Lending  4646.4  -703j.7  1128.6  169.0
Source:  Bank of  Korea,  Financial  Statements  Analysis,  1985.
TABLE 2:  KOREA, CAPITAL FINANCE  ACCOUNT.  1984
Bitlions  of  won  Households  Business  Governmwent  Financial  Institutions
Assets  Liabs  Assets  Liabs  Assets  Liabs  Assets  Liabs
Net  Lending  4285.7  -7533.1  1147.5  272.7
Gold  0.2
Currency  and transferable  deposits  42.8  -14.7  461.9  675.6  1165.7
Other  deposits  2895.6  2591.7  486.7  885.3  6859.4
Life  insurance  reserves**  1804.8  1804.8
Short-term  securities  162.5  -410.8  90.4  9.3  1427.9  1098.5
Long-term  securities  839.7  %  463.3  1440.6  66.1  -116.5  901.8  946.8
Stocks  887.4  584.1  1575.6  19.2  340.0  255.0
Loans by  financial  institutions  3133.5  7171.0  104.2  12413.3  2004.5
Goverrmlent loans  17.4  -8.7  313.5  304.8
Equities  other  than  stocks  730.8  10.7  872.0  210.4  -0.2  79.6
Trade  credit  1327.6  2648.1  1320.4
Foreign  exchange holdings  596.2
Foreign  claims  and debts  1400.8  -171.2  -607.4  505.9  82.5  2436.4
miscellaneous  471.3  1851.7  139.5  65.5  785.5  879.8
Source:  Bank of  Korea,  Financial  Statements  Analysis,  1985.
*(net)
**(and  pension  funds);  Net  equity  of  households.
Note:  GNP=69400  billion  won
5lending 2. In  broad  terms,  the  excess  of each  sector's  gross  savings
(inclusive  of capital  consumption  provisions)  over its  gross  capital
formation  (inclusive  of stock  accumulation),  will  approximate  its
accumulation  of financial  claims  on other  sectors  - shown  as net  lending.
Adjustments  must  however  be made  for  capital  tranqfers,  and  for  purchases
and  sales  of land  and  intangible  assets.
An example  of capital  transfers  would  be a  government  grant  for  the  purpose
of  capital  accumulation.  Net  capital  transfers  to  a sector  allow  it  to
augment  the  resources  provided  by savings  to increase  the  sector's
acquisition  of real  or financial  assets. However,  this  item  tends  to  be
relatively  small 3.
Purchases  and  sales  of land  do not  enter  into  the  current  income  and  outlay
account. But land  is  not  capital  either. A particular  sector  may,
however,  use  some  of its  savings  to  acquire  land  instead  of capital  or
financial  assets. Conversely,  the  sale  of land  by a sector  augments  the
funds  available  to it  for  the  purchase  of capital  or of financial  assets.
Of course  appreciation  in  the  capital  value  of a given  piece  of land  is
invisible  to these  accounts  which  are flow  accounts4.
"Intangible  assets"  refers  to such  things  as patent  rights  which  are
neither  capital  nor  financial  assets.
2  The term  "net  lending'  will  be used interchangeably  with the  term "(net)
financial  surplus".
3 Host,  though  not  all, transfers  from  abroad  tend  to  be current  rather  than
capital  in  nature.
4 Over  time  the  more  valuable  land  may  yield  a  higher  rental  income;  this
flow  will appear  in the  accounts.
6The  Korean  statistics  display  several  features  which  are  typical  of  many
other  countries. First,  the  individuals  or  h2ushold  sector  is the
largest  domestic  saving  sector,  in this  case  with  gross  saving  totalling
8133  billion  won6,  or over  12%  of GNP. To this  is  added  122  of capital
transfers  (evidently  from  the  government)  giving  8256  to  be allocated  to
the  acquisition  of assets. In this  particular  year the  household  sector
sold  land  and intangible  assets  in the  net  amount  of 1092,  which  further
augmented  to 9348  the  funds  available  for  this  sector's  investment  in
capital  and financial  assets. The  household  sector's  accumulation  of real
capital,  at 4702,  is  well  below  this,  leaving  a financial  surplus  (of  4646,
or 7%  of GNP)  to  be lent  to  other  sectors.
The  pattern  for  the  corporations  or  business  sector  (which  here includes
both  public-owned  and  private  enterprises)  is  the  opposite  to that  of the
individual  sector. While  its  capit&l  consumption  provisions  are  sufficient
to  cover  almost  two-fifths  of gross  capital  formation,  remaining  savings
fall  well short  of  covering  the  business  sector's  remaining  needs  for
investment,  and  the  sector  has a  net  accumulation  of indebtedness  of 7031,
or 10.6%  of GNP.
As will  become  evident,  the  net  position  of the  government  sector  varies
widely:  in  Korea  in  1984  the  general  government  ran  a surplus,  not  only  on
current  account  (positive  net savings)  but overall,  with capital  formation
falling  short  of savings  allowing  net  accumulation  of financial  assets  in
the  amount  of 1129  or 1.7%  of GNP.
5  The  practice  is to  include  unincorporated  business  with the  household
sector,  while  corporate  and  quasi-corporate  enterprises  are  included  in  the
business  sector. It is  not always  possible,  however  to adhere  strictly  to
these  categories.
6  The  unit  will  be omitted  for  the  remainder  of  the  section.
7The savings  and  capital  formation  of the  financial  sector  is  comparativoly
small:  its  role is  as an intermediary  and  it  therefore  plays  a bigger  part
in  Table  2.  The  foreiln  sector  is  a residual:  its  net  lending  will  equal
the  sum  of that  of remaining  sectors. Naturally, the  gross  saving  and
capital  formation  of the  rest  of the  world  is  not  recorded  in  the  national
statistics  of any  one  country;  only  the  rest  of the  world's  dealings  with
the  country  in  question  are included.
Table  2, the  capital  finance  account,  shows  the  financial  assets  and
liabilities  which  were accumulated  in  the  year  by each  sector. In
principle  these  should  sum  to the  net  lending  total  for  the  sector  shown  in
Table  1,  but in  practice  there  is  a discrepancy  resulting  from  the
deficiencies  of the  different  sources  of  data  on  which  the  two  tables  are
based. While  Table  1 is drawn  primarily  from  information  in  the income
outlay  accounts,  Table  2 is typically  based  on balance  sheets  and  asset
market  transactions.
Consulting  the  columns  for  the  household  sector,  the  accumulation  of
financial  assets  corresponding  to  the  net lending  position  of this  sector
is  evident  from  the  assets  column. The  sector  acquired  bank  deposits  alone
in an amount  equivalent  to  4.5%  of GNP.  Its  accumulation  of claims  on the
funds  of life  assurance  companies  and  pension  schemes  was  only  somewhat
smaller,  and  there  was considerable  acquisition  of long  term  securities  and
stocks,  and  other  equity  claims. But  what is  noteworthy  is that  the  net
surplus  of the  sector  conceals  considerable  heterogeneity  of behavior.
Thus the  household  sector  also  borrowed  appreciable  sums  from  financial
institutions  as can  be seen  from  the  liabilities  column. There  was  also  an
accumulation  of indebtedness  in trade  credit. It is thus  important  to  bear
in  mind that  even  a single  entity  may  at the  same  time  accumulate  financial
assets  and liabilities,  and  this  applies  a fortiori  to a large  sector. The
8household  sector  does  not issue  securities  or equity;  but the  corporate
sector  does,  and  there  are  correspondingly  fewer  blanks  in  the  columns
relating  to the  corporate  sector.
Once  again  it  emerges  that  the  business  sector  both  borrows  from  and  lends
to (places  diposits  with)  the  financial  sector. But  the  story  is  even  more
complex  than  with  the  household  sector,  as the  entities  in the  business
sector  acquire  claims  on other  eatities  in the  business  sector. For
instance  about  one-half  of trade  credit  is issued  within  the  business
sector.
The  relevance  of the  financial  sector  becomes  evident  in  this  Table  2,  as
it  has entries  on both  sides  of almost  all  the  rows:  only  those  rows  which
relate  by definition  to  claims  of  or on other  sectors  or to gold  have
blanks  under  the  financial  sector. The  gross  acquisition  of financial
claims  by the  financial  sector  is  equivalent  to  over 27%  of GNP - some  66
times  its  net lending,  and  this  pattern  is  not  untypical.
2.2  Financial  assets
Continuing  our  perusal  of the  Korean  data,  we turn  to  Table  3 showing
stocks  of financial  assets  and  liabilities.  The total  value  of outstanding
financial  assets  recorded  comes  to 264,500  billion  won  of  which  38,100  are
held  by the  rest  of the  world. The  total  if financial  assets  held  by
residents  is thus  226,400  or over  325%  of  GNP.  But  this  figure  involves  an
element  of double-counting  including,  as it  does,  both  bank  deposits  and
the  claims  of banks  on their  borrowers. For  many  purposes,  it is
9TABLE  3:  KOREA: FINANCIAL  ASSETS  AND LIABILITIES  BY SECTOR
end-1984
Trillions  of  won  Total  Household  Business  Government  Financial  Rest  of  World
Assets  Liabs  Assets  Liabs  Assets  Liabs  Assets  Liabs  Assets  Liabs
Gold  0.0  0.0  0.0
Currency  and  transferable  deposits  10.2  3.2  2.8  1.5  2.6  10.2
Other  deposits  32.9  20.8  8.1  1.4  2.5  32.9
Life  insurance  and pension  furds  7.3  7.3  ,.3
Short-term  securities  8.7  1.8  1.8  4.2  0.0  5.0  4.5
Long-term  securities  16.9  4.9  1.3  7.9  0.4  0.3  10.3  8.7
Stocks  12.5  7.3  2.8  10.3  0.4  2.0  2.1
Loans by  financial  institutions  70.6  18.0  39.4  3.6  70.6  9.5
Govermuent loans  6.3  0.5  3.3  6.3  2.5
Equities  other  than  stocks  10.6  3.4  1.8  8.7  4.7  0.7  1.9
Trade  credit  18.2  3.4  18.2  14.8
Foreign  exchange holdings  6.3  6.3  6.3
Foreign  claims  and debts  41.8  2.4  11.4  7.2  1.3  19.5  38.1  3.7
Miscellaneous  22.4  3.7  11.3  14.4  1.6  1.2  5.9  6.9
Net  financial  position  30.6  -63.8  3.9  1.3  28.0
Total  264.5  52.5  21.9  50.7  114.4  16.2  12.3  107.1  105.8  38.1  10.0
0
Percentage  of  GNP CGNP=  69.4):
Gold  0.0  0.0  0.0
Currency  and transferable  deposits  14.6  4.7  4.1  2.1  3.8  14.6
Other  deposits  47.4  30.0  11.7  2.0  3.6  47.4
Life  insurance  and pension  funds  10.5  10.5  10.5
Short-term  securities  12.5  2.6  2.7  6.1  0.0  7.2  6.4
Long-term  securities  24.4  7.1  1.9  11.4  0.6  0.5  14.8  12.6
Stocks  18.0  10.5  4.1  14.9  0.5  2.9  3.1
Loans by  financial  institutions  101.8  26.0  56.8  5.2  101.8  13.7
Govern  ent loans  9.0  0.7  4.8  9.0  3.6
Equities  other  than  stocks  15.3  5.0  2.6  12.5  6.8  0.9  2.8
Trade  credit  26.2  4.9  26.2  21.3
Foreign  exchange  holdings  9.1  9.1  9.1
Foreign  claims  and debts  60.2  3.5  16.5  10.3  1.8  28.1  54.9  5.3
Niscellaneous  32.4  5.3  16.3  20.8  2.3  1.7  8.5  9.9
Net  financial  posn  44.1  -91.9  5.6  1.8  40.4
Total  381.4  75.7  31.6  73.1  165.0  23.3  17.7  154.4  152.6  54.9  14.4
Source:  Bank  of  Korea,  Financial  Statements  nalysis,  1985preferable  to  net  out  such  multi-layered  claims
7 . Netting  out  the  domestic
assets  of financial  intermediaries,  we arrive  at a  smaller  figure  of
146,400  or about  210%  of GNP.
The  assets  figures,  unusually  detailed  in  Korea,  allow  us to observe  the
detailed  pattern  of intersectoral  claims  and  liabilities  at a  moment  in
time.
The  biggest  single  liability  for  the  business  sector  is loans  from
financial  institutions,  accounting  for  over  one-third  of that  sector's
gross  financial  liabilities.  Securities,  short  and  long  term,  account  for
only  about  13%  of gross  liabilities,  with stocks  and  other  equities
estimated  at 16.6%. The  business  sector  also  holds  financial  assets,
totalling  almost  45%  of the  value  of its  financial  liabilities.  To some
extent  this  reflects  a borrowing  and  lending  between  different  enterprises
- as  with trade  credit,  which  represents  over  one third  of the  business
sector's  financial  assets. To some  extent  it reflects  simultaneous
holdings  of financial  assets  and  liabilities  by individual  enterprises,  as
when an enterprise  issues  equities  or securities,  but  also  holds  liquid
7 Nevertheless  it  may  be useful  for  some  purposes  to include  both sides  of
the  balance  sheet,  and  thus  to  use  the  larger  figure. This  point  may  be
worch  elaborating.  Consider  a  very simple  economy  with  just  three  agents,  a
mining  company,  a  wealthy  family  and  a  conglomerate.  The  mining  company  has
issued  200  worth  of debentures,  one  half  of  which  are  held  by each  of the
other  two.  In addition  the  conglomerate  is  partly  owned  by the  family,  whose
shareholding  is  worth  95.  The  total  value  of financial  assets  in  this
economy  will generally  be accepted  as 295. Now  consider  another  economy,
differing  only  in that  instead  of a  conglomerate  there  is  a  bank,  and  instead
of the  shareholding  there  is  a deposit  of 95.  Some  might  be inclined  to
treat  the  bank as a transparent  intermediary,  and  count  only  195  of financial
assets. But  after  all the  economy  is financially  more  complex  than  one  in
which  the  family  simply  lent  195  directly  to the  mining  company. The  gross
figure  of 295  has as  much  claim  to  being  a  measure  of the  value  of total
financial  assets  as the  lower  figure. In fact,  it  becomes  clear  from  this
discussion,  that  any  measure  of total  value  of financial  assets  is a  very
imperfect  summary  of the  size  of the  financial  system. Financial
intermediaries  do more  than  channel  funds  from  one  agent  to another,  on the
way they  transform  the  characteristics  of the  assets  involved. The  asset
obtained  by the  depositor  is  very different  to that  which  he would  have
obtained  by lending  directly  to the  bank's  borrower.
il1assets  such  as bank  deposits. More than  one-fifth  of  business  sector
financial  assets  are in the  form  of  money  and  time  deposits. This
highlights  the  important  asset  transfor.ation  function  of the  financial
sector.
For the  household  sector  over  four-fifths  of indebtedness  is  to financial
institutions,  while  almost  one-half  of financial  claims  are  on financial
institutions.  Overall,  household  financial  assets  are  almost  two  and  a
half times  household  financial  liabilities.  Nevertheless  these  liabilities
themselves  are  not  negligible,  being  equivalent  to  almost  one-third  of  GN!P.
The financial  institutions  are  primarily  intermediaries,  their  net
financial  position  coming  to little  over  one  per  cent  of their  gross
financial  assets. Of the  identified  financial  assets  held  by domestic
non-financial  sectors,  almost  two-fhirds  are  intermediated  through  the
financial  institutions.
The  principal  domestic  financial  claims  of the  government  sector  arise  from
loans  made to the  business  and  corporate  sector,  its  principal  domestic
borrowings  are  from  financial  institutions.
There  is a  broad  correspondence  between  the  instrument  structure  of the
asset  holdings  (Table  3)  and  that  of the  flow  figures  (Table  2),  though
this  need  not  always  be the  case. The  remainder  of the  paper  is  concerned
only  with flow  iigures.
2.3  Data  pitfalls
Various  practical  difficulties  mean that  the  reliability  of flow  of funds
statistics  lags  behind  that  of the  national  income  and  expenditure
accounts. Furthermore,  though  the  methodology  for  preparing  flow  of funds
accounts  in the  United  Nations  (SNA)  is  a  widely  accepted  standard,  it is
12not  rigorously  followed  by all  researchers.  These  considerations  imply
that  one  must,  especially  when  comparing  data  from  different  sources,  be
aware  that  there  may  be rather  wide  divergences  between  the  data  presented
and  the  concepts  they  purport  to  measure. It is  our  impression  that  data
problems  are  more  serious  in flow  of funds  data  than  in  most  other
macroeconomic  data  sets,  but  we  believe  that  it is  worthwhile  to examine
the  existing  data.
One of the  most  common  conceptual  problems  relates  to capital  value
changes. Many  elements  in  the  flow  of funds  are  derived  from  comparison  of
successive  balance  sheets  of financial  institutions.  To the  extent  that
the  differences  between  these  balance  sheets  reflect  not  only  flows  in  and
out  of the  institution,  but  also  capital  value  changes,  the  year-to-year
changes  should  not  be entered  as  net  flows  without  adjustment  for  the
capital  value  changes. In  principle,  the  valuation  changes  should  be shown
separately  in  a reconciliation  account. However,  it is  not clear  that  such
corrections  have  been  made systematically  in  the  data  sources  which  we  have
used.
The second  major  problem  - actually  a  variant  of the  first  - relates  to the
problem  of inflation. Even  where  inflation  is fully  anticipated,  contracts
denominated  in  mcney  terms  involve  a transfer  of real  resources  betweer.  the
parties  over time  that  is  concealed  by money  accounting.  Some  authors  have
recommended  that  analysis  of sectoral  savings  and financial  surpluses
should  be carried  out in  inflation  adjusted  terms. When this  is  done,  the
patterns  can  change  dramatically 8. For  example,  the  savings  of the
8 Cf.  Kennedy,  N.O.,  "Inflation-adjusted  sectoral  saving  and  financial
balances",  Bank  _o  England  Ouartrlv Bulletin,  May 1988.
13household  sector,  as a net  holder  of  money-denominated  assets,  tends  to  be
lower  in  inflation-adjusted  data. The  data  analyzed  in  this  paper  are
based  on  money  and  not  on inflation-adjusted  accounting.
A third  major  difficulty  derives  from  the  existence  of discrepancies
between  the  sectoral  income  and  outlay  accounts  and the  financial  data
sources  on  which  the  flow  of funds  tables  are  based. These  discrepancies
have  already  been  noted  in  the  case  of Korea,  but they  exist  in all
countries,  and  are  often  very  large,  by comparison  with  the  sector
surpluses. The  treatment  of these  discrepancies  can  strongly  influence  the
data.
The  fourth  problem,  which  is  pervasive,  is  comprehensiveness.  For  the  most
part,  the  balance  sheets  of financial  institutions  and  the  records  of
organized  securities  markets  provide  the  basis  for  much  of the  capital
finance  accounts  of the  flow  of funds. The equity  injections  by owners  of
closely-held  or quasi-corporate  enterprises  may  often  fail  to  be captured
in the  accounts,  as may  much  of trade  credit. Intra-sectoral  claims  are
frequently  netted  out  or omitted,  and  omissions  are  not  evident  because
they  do  not  violate  adding-up  constraints.
In the  present  paper,  no attempt  has  been  made to  refine  the  flow  of funds
estimates  prepared  by other  authors. Reliance  is thus  being  implicitly
placed  on ar.  assumption  that  the  discrepancies  and  errors  in  the  data  are
sufficiently  random  and  non-systematic  to allow  the  true  systematic
features  to emerge  from  the  statistical  analysis.
143  ANALYTICAL  ISSUES
3.1  Sectors  and  instruments
As illustrated  by the  elements  of the  flow  of funds  tables,  there  are  two
principal  ways  of approaching  the  analysis  of financial  flows  and their
determinants.  The  first  takes  the  economic  sectors  as the  main focus,  the
second  looks  at the  different  financial  instruments.  Each  approach  has its
merits  from  the  point  of  view  of achieving  an  understanding  of  how the
financial  system  works
On ths  one  hand,  an important  function  of the  financial  system  is to
channel  resources  from  surplus  to  deficit  units  in  the  economy  in  an
efficient  manner. The  sectoral  approach  addresses  this  issue 9. Some
theoretical  propositions  concerning  intersectoral  flows  are  discussed  in
Section  3.2  below. The  statistical  analysis  provided  in  section  4 is
motivated  by the  self-evident  proposition  that  the  business  sector  is
likely  to  have  more  worthwhile  investment  opportunities  at the  margin  than
the  household  sector,  and  that  a function  of the  financial  system  is to
ensure  that  investable  funds  flow  smoothly  to take  advantage  of these
opportunities.
On the  other  hand,  the  financial  system  is  preeminently  a  network  of assets
and  corresponding  liabilities;  the  financial  instruments  approach
emphasizes  this  aspect. Section  3.3  below  elaborates  the  function
performed  by different  financial  instruments  in  enabling  different  agents
(or  sectors)  to  pool  risk  or  diverse  timepaths  of net  receipts. Section  5
provides  a  brief  factual  report  on the  use of  different  financial
instruments  in  developing  countries.
9 Though  the  data  distinguishes  sectors  on the  basis  of their  ownership
structure,  and  not  on whether  they  are  borrowing  or lending  sectors. Indeed
as will  be shown  each sector  both issues  and  acquires  financial  claims.
153.2  Intersectoral  flows:  theoretical  framework
3.2.1  Interactions  between  the  savings  behavior  of the  domestic  sectors
It is  not,  of  course,  the  case  that  the  various  economic  sectors
identified  in a flow  of funds  analysis  are  hermetically  sealed  from  one
another  and interact  economically  only  through  their  borrowing  and
lending  activities.  Indeed,  private  enterprises  are  owned  by
households,  and the  borrowings  of government  have  ultimately  to  be
serviced  by recourse  to taxation  which  may  be thought  of as falling  on
households  too. So it  is  often  thought  that  households  are  the  ultimate
focus  of economic  decision-making.  According  to  this  view,  private
firms  act  under  the  general  direction  of their  shareholders  and  the
actions  of government  are  also  noted  and  taken  account  of in the
economic  decisions  of  households. This  line  of  reasoning  underlies  the
much  discussed  'neo-Ricardian"  theory  of debt  and  taxation,  and  the
.Adely  used  value  maximization  approach  to enterprise  financial
decision-making.
If  these  stories  were taken  to the  limit,  the  relations  between  the
savings  behavior  of  households  and  those  of the  other  sectors  would  be
exactly  offsetting.  Enterprise  and  government  savings  would  simply  be
household  savings  at one  remove. An increase  in  enterprise  savings
which  does  not  result  form  a change  in  household  preferences  or
opportunities  would  be fully  offset  by a reduction  in the  savings
undertaken  by the  household. The same  goes  for  government  savings. If
this  were  wholly  true,  then  the  analysis  of flows  of funds  between
sectors  would  be of secondary  importance.  It  would  not  contribute  to an
understanding  of the  process  of  national  savings  and  capital  formation.
16Whatever  about  the  validity  of the  neo-Ricardian  approach  and  value
maximization  theory  in industrial  countries  (and  they  are  much  debated),
it  seems  clear  that  the  serious  imperfections  of  capital  markets  make
the  idealised  models  of integrated  saving  behavior  quite  unrealistic  for
developing  countries.
3.2.2  The fluidity  of international  flows
A simplistic  model  of international  capital  movements  has resources
flowing  from  countries  which  would  otherwise  have  a relatively  low
marginal  efficiency  of capital  to those  which  would  otherwise  have  a
relatively  high  marginal  efficiency  of capital. The flows  would  be
sufficient  to equalize  the  marginal  efficiency  of capital  in all
countries. A shift  in  savings  behavior  in  one  small  country  would  not,
according  to this  extreme  view,  result  in  any  reduction  in  the
investment  funds  available:  the  reduction  in  local  savings  would  be made
up  by the  inflow  of capital  in search  of  what  would  tend  to  become  a
higher  marginal  return  on a smaller  capital  base.
The  empirical  evidence  on the  fluidity  of international  capital  flows  is
somewhat  ambiguous. For industrial  countries  Feldstein  and  Horioka
(1980)  observed  a  high  correlation  across  countries  in  national  savings
and  investment  rates. This  correlation  would  not  be anticipated  if the
international  capital  flows  always  move to  equate  the  marginal  return  on
capital  in all  countries. This finding  has generated  considerable
controversy,  notably  over  how it  should  be interpreted 10 . A recent
extension  of the  study  included  a sample  of 50  developing  countries" 1.
10  Cf.  Obstfeld,  M. "Capital  Mobility  in the  World  Economy",  Carnegie
Rochester  Series  on  Public  Policy,  Vol. 24,  1986.
11  Dooley,  M.P.,  J. Frankel  and  D.  Mathieson:  "International  Capital
Mobility",  IMF  Staff  Papers,  Vol. 34,  September  1987,  pp. 503-30.
17This  analysis  found  that  the  correlation  between  savings  and investment
was  generally  weaker  for  the  developing  countries;  in  fact  there  is  a
clear  link  only  since  1974  and  only  for  those  developing  countries  not
primarily  reliant  on  official  development  assistance.  For  these
countries,  however,  the  link  remains. The  countries  included  in  the
data  sample  discussed  in this  paper  all  fall  into  this  category.
The question  of  whether  or  not the  foreign  sector  is an efficient
residual  supplier  of funds  is  a central  one. As is  argued  later,
domestic  financial  markets  may  not  be very  efficient  at channeling  the
savings  of the  household  sector  to the  enterprise  sector. In
particular,  they  may  be less  able  to absorb  or cope  with risk  than  is
the  financial  system  in  some  industrial  countries. From  a  welfare  point
of  view,  this  may  not  matter  very  much if  the  foreign  sector  can
efficiently  close  any financing  gap  for  the  business  sector  that
results. However  if,  as we  will  argue  appears  to  be the  case,  the
foreign  sector's  provision  of funds  is  based  on exogenous  factors  and
not  on the  needs  of the  domestic  business  sector,  then  the  potential
distortions  are  considerable 12.
Foreign  intermediation  can  play  an important  role  in achieving
investment  efficiency.  But  when foreign  flows  do  not flow  smoothly  in
response  to yield  differentials  there  is  a  need for  policies  to improve
the  efficiency  of  domestic  intermediation.
3.3  Instruments:  sharing  of  risks
Even  an economy  in  which  each  agent  had  no  net  acquisition  of financial
assets  could  involve  a network  of financial  intermediation  serving  to  pool
12  The sources  of this  inefficiency  are  discussed  in  the  Annex,  which  also
explains  why they  may  be considerable.
18risks  and  provide  a smoother  consumption  pattern  for  all. This consumption
smoothing  or risk-sharing  feature  of the  financial  system  tends  to  be
neglected  if there  is too  much emphasis  on intersectoral  net  flows.
Financial  instruments  are  essentially  contracts  which  rearrange  the
distribution  of claims  on economic  resources  in  different  time  periods  and
4n different  contingencies.  Perfect  financial  markets  allow  the  full
resources  of the  economy  to  be allocated  in an  optimal  manner. Financial
market  imperfections  will  result  not  only in  a  misallocation  in  each  period
of the  resources  that  are  available,  but, through  its  effects  on investment
decisions,  will tend  to reduce  the  total  amount  of resources  available  over
time.
A distinction  can  be drawn  between  the  traditional  loan  contract,  which
promises  a fixed  payment  except  in  the  case  of insolvency,  and  financial
assets  whose  terms  are  tailore to the  specific  risk  characteristics  being
faced  by either  borrowers  or lenders. The  archetypical  tailored  instrument
is the  equity,  whose  value  is linked  to the  value  of the  enterprise' 3.
Another  example  of a tailored  instrument  is the  insurance  policy.  The
financial  systems  of developing  countries  emphasize  non-tailored
instruments  such  as  bank deposits. As  will  be discussed  below,  this  limits
the  degree  to  which  rearrangement  of claims  can take  place.
3.3.1  Types  of sharing
Intertemnoral.  A slightly  artificial  distinction  can  be made  between
the  use  of financial  instruments  to  effect  an intertemporal  sharing  of
resources  and  their  use  to pool  or share  risk.  Intertemporal  sharing  is
the  simplest  kind.
13  The  equity  is  an extremely  flexible  instrument  for  rearranging  the  claims
on economic  resources. By  defining  the  enterprise  suitably,  the  equity  can
be tailored  to  virtually  any  contingency.
19Even  without  considering  risk,  financial  instruments  can  allow  economic
agents  to  pool the  resources  available  to  them  so that  each  agent  can
smooth  her consumption  over  time. In this  way financial  instruments  can
not  only  improve  the  welfare  of all  by achieving  a better  allocation  of
a given  amount  of resources,  but  by influencing  investment  decisions,
they  can  result  in  a more  resources  being  produced.1 4
In  terms  of inter-sectoral  flows,  this  story  is clearly  crucial  for
borrowing  by enterprises  for  projects  which  have long  gestation  periods.
It is  also  an important  element  in  household  firnancial  savings' 5, which
release  the  resources  for  investment  by enterprises  in  projects  that
will yield  a return  which  is  higher  than  both  the  marginal  rate  of time
preference  and  the  potential  yield  on  household  investments  such  as
housing. It is likewise  important  for  the  borrowing  by government  to
the  extent  that  this  is  underlain  by high-yielding  public  expenditure  on
infrastructure,  both  physical  and  social. A driving  force  behind
foreign  sector  lending  to  developing  countries  may  also  be a  higher
marginal  efficiency  of capital  in  developing  countries1 6
Risk.  But  the  risk  sharing  function  is also  important,  both  for  the
sellers  and  the  purchasers  of financial  instruments.  The  risk  of
failure  of an investment  project  will  make  the  small  entrepreneur
reluctant  to  undertake  it  unless  he can  reduce  his exposure  to  the  the
risk  by selling  participations  in the  project. If  his total  wealth  is
14 The  argument  is familiar,  and  illustrated  in  figure  A2 in  the  Annex.
15 Life-cycle  models  of consumption  predict  a  build-up  of individual
household  wealth  beforp  retirement  or  old-age;  much of this  wealth  will take
the  form  of  housing  and  other  durables  without  the  benefit  of financial
intermediation,  especially  in  developing  countries.
16 On the  other  hand for  public  borrowing,  and  as a result  also  for  foreign
borrowing,  it  may  be the  private  rate  of return  on the  expenditure  to those
in  power  for  the  time  being,  rather  than  a higher  social  rate  of return  which
is  driving  the  flows.
20large,  the  entrepreneur  can  also  reduce  his  vulnerability  to failure  by
purchasing  participations  in  other  schemes  whose  success  is likely  to  be
negatively  correlated  with  his  own.
But  it is arguably  the  household  that  is  most influenced  by
considerations  of risk  in  deciding  to  acquire  financial  assets  and  in
the  choice  it  makes  between  the  different  financial  assets  that  are
available. Unlike  the  enterprise,  which  may  often  be able  to foresee
the  time-path  of its  financing  needs  over  the  years  ahead  and  will  make
financing  decisions  accordingly,  the  typical  household  plans  on a
relatively  smooth  income  and  consumption  pattern  over time,  but is
buffeted  by unexpected  shocks. Households  need a stock  of  wealth  to
achieve  the  optimum  consumption  pattern  in the  face  of unfavorable
shocks 1 7; the  stock  can  be built  up on a  planned  basis,  as  well  as  being
augmented  by favorable  shocks. To be useful,  this  wealth  needs  to  be
liquid  or tailored  to the  possible  shocks. These  are  characteristics
offered  more  by financial  assets  than  by most  non-financial  assets.
Considerations  of risk-pooling  also  influence  the  willingness  of the
rest  of the  world  to  make  loans  to  a particular  developing  country. But
this  consideration  is symmetrical,  and  therefore  may  have little  impact
on net financial  savings  of the  foreign  sector.
3.3.2  Ability  of instruments  to share
Households  and  enterprises  in  developing  countri*s  interact  on the
financial  markets  by using  a  variety  of instrumen: and  institutions.
The government  and  the  foreign  sector  also  participate. But  not all
instruments  are  equally  well  developed  in these  countries. Banking
17  Which  could  take  the  form  of special  consumption  opportunities  (such  as
the  relaxation  of a ration)  as well  as  unexpected  income  shortfalls.
21forms  the  bulk of the  financial  system  in  most  developing  countries. It
must substitute  for  well-functioning 18 equity  and  bond  markets  in
achieving  a sharing  between  the  sectors  (and  between  individual
households  and  enterprises)  of risk  and  of the  timepazh  of resource
flows.
The  banking  system  is  limited  in the  degree  to  which  it can  perform  this
function. To take  just  one  aspect,  it  provides  to  depositors  as  assets
mainly  or solely  deposits  which  are  denominated  in  money  terms 19.  These
do  not, for  example,  protect  against  unexpected  inflation. Furthermore,
bank deposits  do  not  enable  saving  households  who  do not  own  the
borrowing  enterprises  to  benefit  from  increases  in  the  value  of the
assets  of those  enterprises.  Many  households  would  be  willing  to  accept
some  increased  risk in  order  to  obtain  such  an opportunity.  The limited
menu  necessarily  offered  by banks  results  in lower  economic  welfare  than
if  a full  range  of well-functioning  financial  markets  existed.
This is  only  one illustration  of the  unfulfilled  potential  of a bank
dominated  system. In order  to  provide  a  context  for  assessing  the
statistical  findings  of Section  5  below  on the  use  of financial
instruments  in  developing  country  flows,  the  following  paragraphs
Drovide  an account  of the  particular  characteristics  of  different
inancial  institutions  and  instruments  for  sharing  resources.
18  The  relative  importance  of the  role  of equities  does  not  depend  only  on
their  relative  share  of total  financing,  but  on the  degree  to  which  their  use
is  widespread  among  enterprises,  and  also  on the  efficiency  with  which  the
equity  markets  function.
19 Except  in  countries  where,  because  of chronic  inflation,  indexed  deposits
have  become  widespread.
22£gouit. From  an economic  point  of view20,  equity  is the  archetypical
tailored  financial  instrument.  This  is  because  it  defines  any  project,
enterprise  or asset,  and  transferi  claims  to the  returns  on that  asset.
Most  other  financial  assets  can  be regarded 2l  as special  cases  of the
equity  contract. Any  particular  enterprise  or  prospect  can  be packaged
in such  a  way as to di-ride  the  resources  generated  by the  prospect
between  agents  in  any  desired  manner  through  the  use  of an equity
contract. No other  financial  instrument  is  as versatile:  a fixed
interest  security,  for  example,  cannot  allow  the  holder  to share  in
exceptionally  favorable  outcomes 22.
In order  to  be attractive  to saving  households  in terms  of risk  and
liquidity,  equities  may  need  to  be packaged,  either  by a financial
institution,  or, if  a well-developed  equity  market  exists,  by the
formation  of  a portfolio  by the  household  itself.
The  major  drawback  of equities  is the  problem  of control  over  the
management  of the  prospect  or  enterprise.  Having  obtaine't  ;he  resources
to finance  the  project  through  the  sale  of shares,  the  entrepreneur  may
be in a  position  to  divert  some  of the  proceeds  of the  enterprise  to
himself,  for  example  by overcharging  for  services  that  he himself
provides  to the  enterprise,  directly,  or indirectly.  While  some  control
can  be achieved  through  devices  such  as the  appointment  by the  outside
shareholders  of directors,  and independent  audits  of the  enterprise's
activities,  this  supervision  is  costly  and  likely  to  be only  partially
20  As opposed,  for  example,  to a legal  perspective.  Much  of the  following
discussion  is  not  at all  applicable  to the  legal  forms  of the  various
financial  contracts  discussed.
21 From  the  economic  point  of view;  see  the  previous  footnote.
22  The so-called  "junk-bond"  with its  high  coupon  and  high  risk  of default  is
an imperfect  substitute.
23effective  in  many  circumstances.  This  is  probably  the  most important
type  of imperfection  in  the  capital  markets  and  it  has  severely  limited
the  growth  of equity  markets  in developing  countries 23.
Financial  asset  markets. If  well-functioning  financial  asset  markets
(such  as equity  markets)  exist,  then  all  of the  risk  that  is  specific  to
a given  prospect  can  be diversified  away,  if that  is  desired,  by the
construction  of  well-mixed  portfolios.  Thus  the  expected  rate  of return
an entrepreneur  will  need to  offer  to the  potential  purchaser  of a share
may  be much  lower,  in the  presence  of  well-functioning  equity  market,
than  would  be indica"ied  by the  specific  riskiness  of the  project. The
pubiic  sale  of marketable  shares  thus  offers  external  benefits  to  other
potential  share-issuers,  by enhancing  the  comprehensiveness  of  the
market  and  reducing  the  degree  to  which  any  given  prospect  carries
specific,  non-diversifiable  risk.
This risk-pooling  function  of  asset  markets  also  applies  to the  risks
facing  agents  other  than  the  issuers  of securities.  For  example  a
household  which  owns  a tradable  asset  can  realize  its  value  quickly  in  a
well-functioning  market,  thereby  using  the  market  to insure  against  the
risk  of a sudden  shortfall  in income  or a sudden  consumption  need.
Few  developing  countries  have  well-functioning  financial  asset  markets
in  this  sense,  but  the  trend  is  clearly  towards  their  emergence.
Securitte.  Securities,  or bonds,  differ  from  equities  in that  they
promise  a fixed  return,  not  normally  dependent  on the  success  of the
23 It also  appears  that  entrepreneurs  have  been  reluctant  to share  ownership
rights  with  outside  shareholders,  and  this  has restricted  the  supply  of
equities  also.
24project  or enterprise 24. In the  event  of  non-fulfilment  of this
promise,  a penalty,  such  as the  transfer  of ownership  of the  enterprise
itself,  or some  collateral  asset,  is suffered  by the  obligator. The
bond  contract  escapes  the  problem  of  control  by removing  the  dependence
of the  promised  payment  on the  performance  of the  enterprise.  At the
same  time,  however,  and  by the  same  token,  the  contract  does  a much  less
efficient  job in  transferring  the  claim  on the  underlying  asset 25. If
there  existed  only  bonds,  there  would  be comparatively  little  the
entrepreneur  with  a risky  venture  could  do to  achieve  a smooth
consumption  stream. That  is  not to  say  that  bonds  are  always  riskless
instruments,  with  all  of the  risk  of the  project  remaining  with  the
issuer. Far  form  it:  the  probability  of default  may  be very  high.  But
the  risk  transfer  which  can  be effected  by the  bond contract  is  very
restricted,  and  cannot  really  be tailored  Lo  the  risk-pattern  of each
project  or enterprise.
Bonds  transfer  purchasing  power  between  different  time  periods. A
single  traditional  bond  does  this  in  a fairly  rigid  way: a transfer  of
purchasing  power  now is  balanced  by a regular  stream  of interest
payments  followed  by a larger  capital  repayment 26. A combination  of
24 Of course  there  is  a great  variety  of financial  instruments  intermediate
between  the  pure  bond  which  is  described  here  and the  traditional  equity
share. So far,  however,  the  growth  of such  intermediate  type  instruments  has
not  been conspicuously  faster  in  developing  countries  than  that  of
traditional  equities.
25 For  example,  the  bond-holder  does  not  benefit  if  the  project  is
outstandingly  successful.
26 In inflationary  times  the  real  value  of the  interest  payments  declines  as
time  goes  on,  and  the  effective  average  duration  of the  purchasing  power
transter  is  much  lower. The real  value  of a  bond  with original  maturity  of,
say,  twenty  years,  will  be a fraction  of its  original  value  only a few  years
after  issue  in inflationary  times:  despite  the  long  initial  maturity,  the
bond  will  have  been almost  fully  repaid  after  only  a few  years.
25several  bonds,  or  more  complex  bond-type  transactions,  can  allow  two
partias  to  tailor  the  sharing  of a stream  of  payments  to their  mutual
satisfaction.
InsurancA  contracts.  While  the  holding  of liquid  financial  assets  can
provide  insurance  against  the  uncertainty  of timing  of income  and  of
consumption  needs,  it is  not  practicable  or efficient  for  a household  to
hold financial  assets  in  such  an amount  as to  provide  coverage  against
rare  and  very large  shocks. Early  death  or incapacitation  of the  head
of  household,  or accidental  destruction  by fire  of the  home could  be
examples. Similar  reasoning  applies  to enterprises,  for  example  with
regard  to fire,  damage  of goods  in transit,  and liability  for  accidents
to  workers  and  others.
This is  the  motivation  behind  the  establishment  of insurance  enterprises
which  accept  small  premiums  from  many  policyholders  in return  for
coverage  against  such  risks. The  pooling  of a large  number  of
individually  rare  and  large  risks  results  in  a steady  stream  of payments
to  policyholders  commensurate  with the  inflow  of premium  income.
Insurance  enterprises  interact  with  other  aspects  of the  financial
system  in  a  variety  of ways.  First,  the  policies  have  many  of the
characteristics  of  unconditional  financial  assets. They  are  a claim  on
resources  even  though  the  claim  can  be exercised  only in  certain
contingencies.  Indeed  they  are  an example  of  what  has  been  referred  to
above  as a tailored  financial  instrument.  They  serve  as a cushion
against  unforeseen  shocks  and  enable  holders  to retain  a smooth
consumption  path in  the  face  of income  shocks  or to  meet  unusual
consumption  needs. Second,  the  management  of insurance  enterprises
typically  involves  them  holding  a  more  or less  large  portfolio  of
financial  assets  themselves.  The  average  time  delay  between  the  receipt
26of premium  income  and  the  issue  of  payments  to  policyholders  means  that.
an insurance  enterprise  will  tend  to  build  up a fund. The  longer  the
period  over  which  insurance  is  provided  for  each  premium  payment,  the
larger  this  fund  will tend  to  be.  Third,  their  expertise  in
fund-management,  and  sometimes  their  ability  to  benefit  from  a favorable
fiscal  or regulatory  environment,  has induced  insurance  companies  in
some  countries  to offer  "policies"  which  are  essentially  long-term
savings  media,  rather  than  being  specifically  tailored  to  an insurable
contingency.
Insurance  enterprises  facilitate  the  transfer  of risks  in two  ways.
First,  they  provide  tailored  contracts  to  the  policyholders  essentially
eliminating  diversifiable 27 (and  for  the  most  part  non-business)  risks.
Second,  their  large  funds  can  be composed  of a diversified  portfolio  of
financial  assets  which,  though  individually  risky,  are  stable  in  the
aggregate. In the  absence  of a  well-functioning  assets  market,  the
large  funds  of insurance  companies  may  provide  a substitute,  allowing
individual  entrepreneurs  to fund  projects  more  easily. In  many
countries,  however,  strict  controls  (designed  to enhance  the  security  of
policyholders)  govern  the  investment  policies  of insurance  enterprises,
and  these  limit  the  degree  to  which  this  risk  diversification  of assets
can  be achieved.
Bank  deposits  and  loans. Bank  deposits  form  the  bulk  of financial
assets  in  developing  countries.  Like  insurance  enterprises,  banks
perform  a risk-transformation  function  on  both sides  of their  balance
sheet. On the  deposit  side,  banks  provide  a liquid  asset  which  serves
27 Some  risks  are  too  big for  insurance  enterprises  to insure. On the  global
level  this  could  include  climatic  changes  or global  war.  On a national
level,  floods  or earthquakes  could  pose  risks  too  large  for  enterprises  to
bear.  International  reinsurance  of large  risks  serves  to  diversify  such
large  national  risks  internationally.
27to  pool  the individual  stochastic  needs  for  spending  power. Only  a.
small  fraction  of the  deposit  claims  on the  bank  needs  to  be kept in
liquid  form,  the  remainder  can  be held in illiquid  and  higher  yielding
forms  of asset. If  each  depositor  owned  a fraction  of the  bank's  asset
portfolio  instead  of  having  a deposit  claim,  he or she  would  not  be
assured  of ready  access  to spending  power  to  meet  an  unexpected
consumption  need.  Especially  in  the  absence  of well-functioning  asset
markets,  then,  the  bank  performs  an important  liquidity  generating
function: the  risk  of unexpected  cash  requirements  is transferred  from
the individual  to  all  of the  depositors,  is  pooled  and  thereby
essentially  eliminated 28.
Apart  from  liquid  assets  and  government  securities,  banks  hold in their
portfolio  loan  claims. These  are  normally  analogous  to  non-traded
bonds,  though  in some  countries  banks  may also  hold  equities. The
degree  to  which  banks  accept  a transfer  of risk  in  their  loan  operation
depends  on the  degree  to  which  their  loans  are  collateralized.  Fully  or
over-collateralized  loans  transfer  little  or  no risk  since  the  bank is
assured  of full  recovery  of the  amount  borrowed  with interest. In
practice,  however,  collateral  values  are  themselves  risky;  furthermore
they  may  be correlated  with  the  results  of the  project  or enterprise.
Even  cautious  banking  systems  accept  and  pool  considerable  amounts  of
risk.
Likewise,  banks  are  reasonably  good  at transferring  resources  across
time. While  it is  in the  nature  of the  bank-borrower  relationship  that
28 Except  where  financial  distress  may threaten  to compromise  the  bank's
ability  to  meet  deposit  withdrawals,  a situation  which  has  become  more
widespread  in recent  years.
28banks  will generally  be reluctant  to  make long-term  loans,  a  performing
borrower  will  typically  be able  to  rollover  his loan,  thereby  converting
a sequence  of short-term  loans  into  a long-term  one.
However,  controls  over  interest  rates,  both for  depositors  and  lenders,
has  been  a major  obstacle  preventing  the  banks  from intermediating
effectively  in  developing  countries. Other  controls,  such  as directed
credit  programs  and  lending  at the  behest  of government  have  also
weakened  the  ability  of the  banks  to function  in  the  way  we have
discussed. Such  controls  are  arguably  the  most important  single  factor
in limiting  the  effectiveness  of the  financial  systems  in  developing
countries.
The external  sector. It is  documented  for  many  countries  that  residents
have large  holdings  of financial  assets  outside  the  home country.
Administrative  and  legal  restrictions  on  outward  capital  movements  are
generally  insufficient  to inhibit  recourse  by savers  to savings  media
offered  by financial  institutions  abroad. Clearly  part of the
motivation  for  domestic  savers  in  placing  their  funds  abroad  is
political  risk.  In  many cases  interest  rate  controls  at  home  also  mean
that  foreign  financial  assets  offer  higher  expected  returns. But  there
is also  a  considerable  gain  from  portfolio  diversification  along  the
lines  we have  discussed  for  other  instruments,  particularly  when the
domestic  availability  of such  savings  media  is  limited.
If one  could  be sure  of fairly  easy  access  by developing  country
governments  and  business  borrowers  to international  credit  the  welfare
29implications  of this  intenation0al  intermediation  of domestic  savings
may  not  be too  serious 29. As discussed  below,  however,  such  easy  access
is  not  apparently  the  case.
29  Admittedly  it  holds  back the  development  of the  domestic  financial  sector
with the  value  added  which  might  be retained  in the  developin world.
Furthermore  it  can  often  distort  incentives  by requiring  the Involvement  of
developing  country  governments  to guarantee  private  borrowings. But  it  would
not  result  in  a reduction  of the  total  volume  of investable  resources  to the
developing  countries  concerned.
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4.1  Main features  of  th-  data
The  data  used in this  section  are  drawn  from  a  variety  of sources,  some
unpublished,  some  official,  some  based  on the  work of independent
researchers,  some  drawn  from  World  Bank  sources 30. Data  for  seventeen
countries  have  been  used.  For  most  of the  countries,  the  data  are  an
elaboration  of the  national  income  and  expenditure  accounts,  with  savings
and  real  investment  data  broken  down  by sector. In other  cases  the
financial  surplus  figures  are  built  up from  flow  of funds  accounts  based  on
balance  sheet  data  from  the  financial  system.
Financial  Surpluses
This  section  is  primarily  based  on the  data  for  sectoral  financial'
surpluses  (net  lending)  for  four  sectors32  - household,  business,
government  and  foreign  - for  seventeen  countries. State  enterprises  (where
separately  available)  are  included  in the  business  sector.
Each  surplus  (or  deficit  if  negative)  is  expressed  as a  percentage  share  of
GNP.  For  each  country  there  is  data  for  at least  three  years;  the  longest
time  series  is  for  Colombia  (16  years). Except  for  four  countries,  the
30  See  annexed  list  of sources. It should  be noted  in  particular  that  no
attempt  was  made to improve  on the  statistics  obtained  from  other  studies.
The  underlying  methodology  is  not  necessarily  the  same in  all  sources  and it
is  likely  that  significant  conceptual  differences  remain.
31  Henceforth  the  word "financial"  will  be omitted;  except  where  explicitly
stated,  the  discussion  refers  to financial  surplus  or equivalently  net
lending. A financial  deficit  (net  borrowing)  is treated  as a  negative
surplus.
32 For  most  of the  countries  these  four  sectors  are  exhaustive. For  a few
countries  a separate  financial  sector  was  identified  in  the  data. This
sector,  where  separately  identified,  was  omitted  from  the  data  set  being
reviewed  here. In other  cases  statistical  discrepancies  prevented  the
sectoral  surpluses  from  adding  to zero.
31TABLE 4: SECTORAL SURPLUSES AS  % SHARE IN GNP
Selected  countries
Average for sample  years
Hhold  Business  Govt  Foreign
Algeria, 82-5  7.33  -14.57  4.12  0.25
Cameroon, 80-4  4.02  -9.44  2.65  2.77
Chile, 83-5  3.65  -6.92  -4.32  7.59
China, 82-6  7.01  -8.08  0.27  0.80
Colombia, 70-86  3.54  -4.63  -0.21  1.29
Cote d'Ivoire, 71-8  1.45  -7.74  1.29  4.40
Ecuador, 80-5  5.13  -6.77  -2.47  4.95
India, 70-82  5.52  -1.15  -5.47  1.10
Indonesia, 82-6  3.01  -4.06  -2.97  5.02
Korea, 80-5  6.97  -13.35  1.12  5.15
Malaysia, 80, 85-6  16.79  -7.15  -12.24  1.71
Philippines, 83-5  9.07  -6.96  -3.64  2.93
Portugal, 77-9, 81  14.31  -16.06  -7.28  7.58
Thailand, 81-3  6.78  -6.52  -4.28  5.72
Tunisia, 77, 80-4  2.05  -13.65  2.45  9.10
Turkey, 71-81  7.73  -10.99  -0.86  3.16
Yugoslavia, 70-85  7.02  -8.24  0.69  1.19
Average  6.66  -7.38  -1.69  2.37
32time  series  are  not  really  long  enough  to carry  out  statistical  analysis.
Instead  we have pooled  the  data to  yield  118  country-year  observation
points33.
The  most salient  features  of this  data  set  are  that  (for  all  but one  point)
the  household  sector  is a surplus  sector,  and  that  (for  all  but two  points)
the  business  sector  is a deficit  sector. The  mean  surplus  of the  household
sector  is 6.7%  of GNP;  the  mean  deficit  of the  business  sector  is 7.4%.
Household  surpluses  range  as  high  as 20%  of GNP  in a  particular  year.
There  is  much  wider  variation  in  the  goverrment  surplus  (mean  -1.7%  of  GNP)
and  the  foreign  surplus  (mean  2.4%  of  GAIP).  The  full  data  set  is  presented
in  Appendix  Table  1, the  country  averages  in  Table  434.
There  is  no systematic  variation  by region  evident  in  the  data.  Even  for
the  household  surpluses  (shown  in figure  1,  with the  countries  grouped  by
region)  Asia does  not  have  uniformly  high  figures.
Self-financing  ratios
Table  5 and  Appendix  Table  2 show  the  estimated  self-financing  ratios,  i.e.
the  ratio  of gross  sector  savings  to  gross  sector  investment  for  each  of
33  Econometric  techniques  exist  for  improving  the  e' iciency  of parameter
estimates  in  data  which  is a  pooled  cross  section  arLd  time  series. These
techniques  exploit  the  possible  existence  of  country-specific  and
date-specific  contributions  to the  disturbance  terms. Without  using  these
techniques  estimation  efficiency  may  be compromised  to the  extent  that  the
error  terms  are  not  classical  (for  example  they  might  display
heteroskedasticity).  Our  data  set  spans  seventeen  years  (1970-86)  for
seventeen  countries,  but  of a potential  total  of 289  observations  for  that
number  of  years  and  countries  we have only  118  observations.  This large
ratio  of  missing  observations  precluded  use  of cross  section-time  series
techniques.
34  A small  data  series  for  four  industrial  countries  is shown  in  Appendix
Table  4.
33TABLE  5:  SELF-FINANCING  RATIOS
Country  averages
Country,  date  Hhold  Business  Govt
Cameroon  80-4  10.16  0.41  1.22
China  82-6  2.26  0.63  1.07
Colombia  70-86  1.67  0.53  1.20
Cote  d'Ivoire  71-8  1.42  0.37  1.13
Ecuador  80-5  1.88  0.36  0.70
India  70-82  1.59  0.62  0.43
Korea  80-4  2.07  0.42  1.38
Malaysia  80,  85-6  6.95  0.54  -0.08
Portugal  77-81  2.45  0.02  -0.52
Thailand  81-3  2.94  0.58  0.04
Tunisia  77,  80-4  1.50  0.30  1.79
Turkey  71-81  3.08  0.23  0.88
Yugoslavia  70-85  2.11  0.73  1.29
Average  2.36  0.55  0.84
Selected  countries,  sample  years.
34the  household,  business  and  government  sectors  in  thirteen  countries. Of
greatest  interest  is the  ratio  for  business. It shows  that  this  sector  has
had, on a-erage,  a substantial  net  external  financing  need in  all
countries 35. On average  over  a  period  of years,  the  weighted  average  for
the  thirteen  countries  comes  to  just over  one-half,  so that,  as a rough
rule  of thumb  we could  say  that  the  data  indicates  that  about  one-half  of
business's  needs  for  financing  capital  accumulation  are  met  by external
funding 3 6 .
The  self-financing  ratios  are  based  on  data for  gross  saving  and  gross
investment,  as a share  of GNP 37. This  data  is  of interest  for  its  own
sake,  and  is shown  in  Table  6 and  Appendix  Table  3.  For  the  sample  of
countries  and  time  periods  covered,  the  household  sector  saved  on average
about  one-half  as  much again  as the  business  sector.
4.2  Exogenous  determinants
What  exogenous  factors  determine  the  sectoral  financial  surpluses? The
question  of whether  the  foreign,  or the  government  net  lending  are
exogenous  to the  household  and  business  sectors  will  be reviewed  later.
For  this  section  "reduced  form"  regressions  were  estimated  purporting  to
explain  variations  in each  of the  sector  surpluses  without  reference  to
each  other.
The  exogenous  factors  for  which  data  were  collected  are  openness  (measured
by the  sum  of import  and  export  shares  in  GNP),  per  capita  income,  GNP
growth  rate,  real interest  rate  (measured  as  a differential  over  the  real
35  Other  than  the  Philippines.  The  Philippines  data  covers  a rather
disturbed  period  and  records  gross  disinvestment  by the  business  sector  in
some  years:  self-financing  ratios  have little  meaning  in such  a context.
36  Ratios  for  a few  industrial  countries  are  also  in  Appendix  Table  4.
37  Gross  saving  includes  provision  for  capital  consumption;  gross  investment
includes  changes  in inventories.
35TABLE 6: SECTORAL SAVING  AND INVESTMENT
%GNP  Investment  Saving
Country, date  Hhold Business  Govt  Hhold Business  Govt
Cameroon 80-4  0.4  18.7  5.9  4.4  9.2  8.5
China 82-6  5.5  22.1  6.0  12.5  14.1  6.3
Colombia 70-86  5.1  10.4  3.4  8.5  5.6  3.6
Cote d'Ivoire 71-8  3.0  12.3  8.9  4.4  4.4  10.2
Ecuador 80-5  5.0  11.1  6.4  9.1  3.8  4.8
India 70-82  9.3  2.9  9.6  14.8  1.8  4.1
Korea 80-4  5.3  20.0  4.6  10.3  8.3  6.3
Malaysia 80, 85-6  2.9  16.3  11.1  19.7  9.1  -1.1
Malta 80-5  7.3  12.3  6.4  8.7  6.2  9.8
Philippines 83-6  1.4  3.6  13.2  14.1  0.1  3.4
Portugal 77-81  10.1  17.4  3.9  24.8  0.3  2.2
Thailand 81-3  3.6  15.2  4.4  10.4  8.7  0.2
Tunisia 77, 80-4  4.4  20.4  5.2  6.5  6.2  9.1
Turkey 71-81  3.8  14.3  5.6  11.5  3.4  4.8
Yugoslavia 70-85  6.7  30.3  4.5  13.8  22.0  5.2
Average  6.0  15.6  6.7  12.9  8.6  4.9
Selected countries, sample years.
36US dollar  interest  rate) 38, and  population  size. The  regression  results
were  somewhat  sensitive  to the  exact  specification  of the  equations 39,  but
a "best"  set  of results  is shown  in  Table  7.  The implications  of the
estimated  equations  may  be summarized  as follows:
More  9=  economies  have larger  business  deficits  and  larger  household
surpluses. More finance  comes  from  abroad. As an indication  of
magnitudes,  an increase  of 10  percentage  points  in the  combined  share
of imports  plus  exports  increases  business  sector  borrowing  by 0.6%  of
GNP (or  by almost  one-tenth  of its  mean level  in the  sample  of 7.4%  of
GNP).
High =er  capita  income  countries  have  a  higher  household  surplus  and  a
higher  business  deficit. There  is less  finance  from  overseas. An
increase  of $500  in  per  capita  income  is  associated  with  more
household  lending  to the  extent  of 1%  of GNP.
Faster  growth  countries  have  more  business  borrowing  financed  by less
government  borrowing. A growth  rate  5%  per  annum  higher  is  associated
with  more  business  borrowing  to the  extent  of 1% of  GNP.
More  Dopulous  countries  have  more  household  lending,  more government
borrowing  and  less  borrowing  from  abroad.
38  This  variable  is intended  to  capture  the  competitiveness  of domestic
financial  assets  relative  to foreign  financial  assets.
39  In particular  a decision  had to  be made  whether  to opt  for  results  in
equations  which  included  country  dummies,  or  whether  to leave  such  dummies
out.  In favor  of reporting  results  based  on exclusion  of country  dummies  is
an  expectation  that  this  will increase  the  efficiency  of the  estimate  of the
impact  of the  other  exogenous  variables.
37TABLE  7:  REDUCED FORff  EQUATIONS FOR  SECTORkL  SURPLUSES
Explaining:  Household  Business  Government  Foreign
Openness  4.1  (2.5)  -5.5  (2.8)  -1.8  (0.9)  3.6  (2.6)
Per capita GNP  2.4  (5.2)  -1.5  (2.7)  0.4  (0.7)  -1.2  (2.2)
GNP growth rate  -0.1  (1.0)  -0.2  (2.7)  0.2  (1.8)  0.0  (0.1)
Real  interest dlffl.  -0.1  (0.0)  12.0  (2.8)  -5.0  (1.2)  -7.4  (..2)
Population  (log)  1.4  (4.4)  0.3  (0.7)  -0.9  (2.4)  -0.7  (2.3)
RSQ  0.25  0.34  0.13  0.21
RBARSQ  0.22  0.31  0.09  0.17
Standard Error  3.4  4.1  4.0  3.2
38Higher  domestic  inSteres  rate (relative  to those  abroad)  lead  to  less
business  borrowing  and  less  lending  from  abroad. A ten  percentage
point increase in interest rates is associated  with a reduction in
business  borrowing  in the  amount  of 1.2%  of  GNPM 0.
4.3  Pulling  and  pushing  sectors
The independence  of foreign  and  government  surpluses
Turning  to the  data  on intersectoral  flows,  we examined  the  correlation
between  the  surpluses  of the  various  sectors  and  discovered  that,  although
these  are  linked  by an adding-up  constraint,  the  degree  of  bivariate
correlation  varies  widely. One  striking  fact  is the  apparent  lack  of
correlation  between  foreign  and  government  surpluses. (Equations  1  and  2).
Though  least  squares  estimates  imply  a correlation,  instrumental  variables
correction  in  equation  2 shows  this  to  be spurious. Thus,  if the  foreign
surplus  is  thought  of as exogenous  to the  business  and  household  sectors,
we can interpret  this  as a lack  of response  of the  government  surplus  to
changes  in  the  availability  of foreign  funds. Such  changes  must  thus  be
absorbed  by the  business  and  household  sectors 41.
G - -0.271 - 0.286 F  (1)
(0.6)  (2.7)
RSQ-0.060 # of obs  - 118 (full  sample) OLS
G - -2.208  0.359 F  (2)
(2.4)  (1.3)
RSQ--0.24 # of  obs  - 118  (full  sample) 2SLS
40 It should  be noted  that  this  result  is  not in line  with the  theory  that
higher  interest  rates  lead  to  more domestic  intermediation.
41 In all  of the  regression  equations,  the  -bsolute  value  of the  t-statistic
is  shown  in  parentheses  below  each  regression  coefficient.
39The foreign and gfovernmn  sctors  are the pushdin:z  x  setr
As explained,  a  key  question  is  whether  the  foreign  surplus  may  be regarded
as exogenous  to  the  business  and  household  surpluses. Regression  equations
explaining  household  and  business  surpluses  respectively  by foreign  or42
foreign  plus  government  surplus  (FG)  identified  a strong  negative
correlation  in the  case  of the  business  sector,  and  a  weaker  negative
correlation  in  the  case  of the  household  sector. (For  example  equations  3
and  4).
These  estimates  were  obtained  by ordinary  least  squares. One  way  of
gauging  the  degree  to  which  FG is  exogenous  is  to re-estimate  the  equation
by an instrumental  variables  technique  (such  as 2SLS)  and  assess  the
difference  between  the  two  estimates. Equations  5 and  6  use  an instrument
list4 3 with this  in  mind.  The  finding  is that  the  coefficient  of the  sum
of foreign  and  government  surpluses  does  not  change  very dramatically  when
moving  from  OLS to  2SLS,  especially  when a  reduced  data  set  omitting  three
countries  which  experience  outlying  behavior  is  used (equations  3' to
6')44.  To the  extent  that  there  is  bias,  it  is in the  sense  of
exaggerating  the  impact  of foreign  and  government  surplus  on the  household
sector. With the  full  sample,  after  correcting  for  simultaneous  equations
bias,  the  estimated  impact  of the  sum  of foreign  and  government  surplus  on
42  The  similarity  of the  coefficients  on the  G and  F terms  in the  estimated
equations  suggests  that  the  business  and  household  sectors  both  respond  to  a
financing  shock  to a degree  which  is independent  of the  source  of the  shock.
This  was  verified  by imPosing  the  restriction  that  the  coefficient  on each  of
F and  G be the  same.  This  restriction  satisfied  the  appropriate  F-test.
43  GNP  per  capita,  share  of exports  in  GNP, inflation,  population,  real
interest  differential  vis-a-vis  the  US$ and  GNP  growth  rate.
44  Observations  for  Malaysia,  the  Philippines  and  Portugal  are  outliers  in
equations  (3)  and  (4). This  suggested  examining  results  for  a reduced  data
set  omitting  these  countries. The  exclusion  of  outliers  is always
controversial;  in this  case  the  uncertain  quality  of some  of the  data,  and
the  certainty  that  the  equations  are  underspecified  seems  to argue  in favor
of  erring  on the  side  of exclusion.
40the  household  surplus  is insignificantly  different  from  zero  (equation  5).
With  the  reduced  sample  there  is a  significant  effect,  but it is  small
(equation  5').
H - 6.51 - 0.331 FG  (3)
(18.6)  (4.9)
RSQ-0.171 #  of obs  - 118  (full  sample)  OLS
B - -6.62 - 0.637 FG  (4)
(17.5)  (8.7)
RSQ-0.397 #  of obs  - 118 (full  sample)  OLS
H - 6.07 - 0.105 FG  (5)
(13.9) (0.7)
RSQ-0.091 # of obs  - 118 (full  sample)  2SLS
B  - -6.07 - 0.917 FG  (6)
(12.7)  (6.0)
RSQ-0.321 #  of  obs  - 118  (full  sample)  2SLS
H  - 5.61 - 0.184 FG  (3')
(19.5)  (3.2)
RSQ-0.090 #  of obs  - 108 (reduced  sample)  OLS
B  - -5.69 - 0.788 FG  (4')
(18.2) (12.7)
RSQ-0.605 # of obs  - 108  (reduced  sample)  OLS
H - 5.55 - 0.158 FG  (5')
(17.4) (2.0)
RSQ-0.088 #  of obs  - 108 (reduced  sample)  2SLS
41B - -5.65 - 0.803 FG  (6')
(16.3) (9.2)
RSQ-0.605 #  of obs  - 108  (reduced  sample)  2SLS
Relying  especially  on the  reduced  data  set,  we conclude  that  FG is
exogenous  to the  household  and  business  sector  surpluses,  and  that  the
response  of the  business  sector  is  much  larger  - five  times  as large  or
more - than  that  of the  household  sector.
In  order  to discover  whether  the  response  of the  business  surplus  to
foreign  and  government  shocks  was  achieved  by a reduction  in investment  or
an increase  in  savings,  regressions  on each  component  were run  for  a
smaller  sample  of countries  where  savings  and  investment  were separately
available  (equations  7  and 8). The  results  were  unambiguous. A fall  in
foreign  sector  or government  lending  is associated  with  a reduction  in
business  investment  and  not in  an increase  in  business  savingA5.
BBI - 13.53 +  1.111 FG  (7)
(14.0)  (3.7)
RSQ-0.073 #  of obs  - 104 (full  sample)  2SLS
BBS - 7.41 +  0.268 FG  (8)
(8.9)  (1.0)
RSQ-0.005 #  of obs  - 104 (full  sample)  2SLS
The  conclusion  of this  analysis  is that  exogenous  swings  in  the
availability  of foreign  finance  or in  the  government's  surplus  are  absorbed
almost  entirely  by the  business  sector. The  household  sector  does  not, in
other  words,  come  forward  to  any  large  extent  with additional  financial
45 Curiously,  we also  found  that,  while  household  surplus  responds  little  to
FG,  there  is  a correlation  between  FG and  each  of  household  savings  and
investment  separately.  The  size  of the  estimated  impact  on each  Is about  tha
same  resulting  in a  negligible  impact  on the  household  surplus.
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43saving  so  as to  make good  any  shortfall  in  foreign  financing. Furthermore,
we also  discovered  that  government  borrowing  crowds  out  the  business  sector
much  more than  the  household  sector. It should  of course  be noted  that
this  argument  is  based  on average  behavior  of the  countries  in  our  sample,
and  there  are  exceptions  in  specific  countries  at specific  times. Like  all
conclusions  based  on  econometric  evidence  it  is subject  to revision  in the
light  of the  collection  of additional  information.
4.4  Cyclical  factors  in individual  countries
Sectoral  surpluses  in  most  of the  countries  which  we examined  are  quite
variable  from  year  to  year.  Here  we briefly  mention  some  features  of the
experience  of four  countries  for  which  relatively  long  time  series  are
available.
Colombia. Figure  2  displays  the  co-movements  of the  household  surplus  with
the  net  position  of the  foreign  plus  government  sectors,  1970-86. The
first  half of this  period  was  marked  by sharp  fluctuations  in the  series,
while  the  second  half  displays  stability.  The  underlying  reason  for  the
difference  between  the  two  halves  is  evident  from  figure  3: from  1978  on,
movements  in  the  external  surplus  were  sterilized  by fiscal  action:  the
external  and  fiscal  surpluses  became  mirror  images  of one  another. In this
respect  the  second  half  of the  Colombia  data  set  provides  an  exception  to
the  general  rule  that  government  surplus  does  not  respond  to  shifts  in  the
external  sector. In  Colombia,  government  revenue  is  very  dependent  on
export  taxes,  and thereby  negatively  correlated  with the  current  account
deficit  (i.e.  the  surplus  of the  foreign  sector) But  the  government  did
not,  however,  allow  fluctuations  in  this  revenue  source  to influence
expenditure.  Because  of the  importance  of export  performance  in GDP,  the
44Figure  3
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45foreign  surplus  is  also  negatively  correlated  with the  GDP  growth  rate  in
Colombia,  which  thus  displays  a clear  cyclical  pattern  in two  of the
sectoral  surpluses.
India. In  contrast,  the  sharp  fluctuations  in  GDP  growth  rates  in  India
during  the  sample  period  1970-82  were  not  reflected  in  any  clear  cyclical
pattern  of sectoral  surpluses  (figure  4).  Some  negative  correlation
between  foreign  and  household  sectors  became  less  evident  in the  latter
part  of the  sample  period. Regression  analysis  suggests  a lower
responsiveness  of business  surplus  to foreign  shocks  in India  than  in  most
other  countries.
Turkey. The  business  sector  in  Turkey  increased  its  recourse  to  external
financing  fairly  steadily  over  the  period  1971-80. A negative  correlation
of  business  and  foreign  surplus  can  be seen  in figure  5, as  well  as from
regression  analysis  (correlation--0.57).
LUgoslgvi&.  Yugoslavia  provides  some  interesting  features. Until  1983
there  is  a strong  negative  correlat:.on  betwean  the  business  and  foreign
sector  (figure  6).  After  that  the  relation  breaks  down,  resulting  in  a
fairly  weak  correlation  (-0.33)  over  the  whole  period. For  the  household
sector  the  story  is  also  noteworthy. In  contrast  to the  non-socialist
countries,  which  display  a negative  correlation  between  household  surplus
and  both  government  and  foreign  surpluses,  with shocks  from  each  source
having  about  an equal  impact,  in  Yugoslavia  the  government  surplus  is
positively  correlated  with the  household  surplus. The  result  is  that  the
estimated  impact  of changes  in  government  plus  foreign  surplus  is about
zero,  with two  offsetting  effects  cancelling  each  other.
46Figure  5
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7~~~~~~~44.5  The  message  from  the  principal  components46
The  multidimensional  nature  of the  intersectoral  flow  data  makes  it
somewhat  difficult  to  summarize  the  experience  of  different  countries  and
identify  trends  and  common  features. One  way  of simr 4<ying  this  kind  of
data  set  is to consider  only  first  one  or two  principaJ  components47  of the
data.  The  first  principal  component  is  an artificial  data  series
constructed  in such  a way  that  it  has a  very  high  correlation  with all  of
the  four  sectoral  surplus  series. It is  thus  a good  summary  of the  entire
data  set.
The  first  principal  component  "P1"  of the  data  matrix  consisting  of the
four  surplus  vectors  (each  consisting  of 106  data  points)  is  plotted  in
figure  7.  It  has  no immediate  interpretation  as  an economic  variable,  but
provides  the  basis  for  some  further  analysis. This  component  "explains'
just over  50  per  cent  of the  variation  in  the  four  surplus  vectors.
Though  with  only  50 per  cent  explanatory  power  of a four-dimensional  data
set,  P1 is  not  as good  a one-dimensional  summary  as one  might  hope for,  it
nevertheless  seems  worth  analysing  in its  own  right. Figure  8 orders  the
countries  by the  average  value  they  score  on this  variable  over  their
sample  period. A confidence  interval  is  constructed  around  each  mean.  The
ranking  of countries  once  again  shows  no clear  pattern  by geographical
region.
An interesting  feature  of P1 is  the  differing  degree  to  which  it is
correlated  with individual  surplus  series. Its  correlation  with  the
46 This  section  is  based  on  a  somewhat  smaller  sample,  not including  Ecuador
or Portugal,  and  with  a number  of small  differences  from  the  main  data  set.
47  A precise  statement  of the  properties  of  principal  components  is  contained
in,  for  example,  T.W.  Anderson,  &U Introduction  to  Multivariate  Statistical
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49business  sector  is  highest  (explaining  94%  of the  variation  in that
surplus),  followed  by the  government  surplus,  of which  it explains  50%.
For  the  foreign  surplus  the  explanatior.  is  only  12%,  and  for  the  household
sector  only  2%.  If P1  adequately  summarised  the  data  we could  say  that  the
main systematic  factor  in  a cross-country  review  of  sectoral  surpluses  was
a covariance  between  government  and  business  surpluses. The  explanatory
power  of P1 is  not  high  enough  to  warrant  such  a  categorical  statement;
nevertheless  the  principal  components  analysis  calls  attention  to the  role
of the  government  in  crowding  out  the  business  sector48.
48 The  second  principal  component,  P2,  which  explained  about  26%  of the
variation  was  heavily  weighted  towards  the  household  surplus  (explaining  83%)
compared  with 32%  for  the  government  sector  and  less  than  4% each  for  the
remaining  two.  It  may  represent  the  (lesser)  crowding  out  of  households  by
the  government  sector. The  third  principal  component,  P3,  carried  most  of
the  explanatory  power  for  the  foreign  se.tor.
505  INSTRUMENTS  IN  DEVELOPING  COUNTRY  FLOWS
Information  about  the  instruments  used  in financial  flows  in  developing
countries  is sketchy. For  only  a few  countries  are  reasonably  complete
capital  finance  accounts  available  and  even  these  are  not  prepared  on a
strictly  comparable  basis. Table  8  presents  composite  figures  for  eight
countries  in respect  of  which  data  are  available. For  each  country,  an
average  of three  consecutive  years  was  taken49.
There  are  quite  wide  variations  between  the  data  for  individual  countries
from  which  the  composite  is formed. Tnis  may  be partly  due  to differences  in
the  methodology  of data  collection,  but is  also  undoubtedly  also  attributable
to  real  differences  in  economic  structures 50. Accordingly,  the  composite
should  not  be seen  as  a norm  to  which  most  countries  approximate,  but  more  as
an approximate  average  of a fairly  disparate  group  of country  structures.
The  main features  of the  business  and  household  sector  flow  use  of financial
instruments  are  displayed  sch3matically  in  figure  9.  This  shows  th6  use  of
different  types  of financial  instruments  in  household  and  business  sector
flows. The  width  of the  arrows  represents  the  relative  magnitude  of flows,
based  on the  six-country  composite  of Table  8.  Thus  for  example  households
49 Except  Portugal:  two  years. Data for  a composite  of four  industrial
countries  are  shown  in  Appendix  Table  4.
50  The cases  of  Cameroon  and  Yugoslavia  can  be mentioned. In  Cameroon  there
is a large  informal  financial  sector,  more developed,  perhaps  than  in  any
other  country. The 1984  study  from  which  our  data  are  drawn  attempted  to
estimate  the  size  of the  informal  intermediated  financial  transactions.
While  this  was deduced  as a residual,  and  may  not  be very trustworthy,  it  is
interesting  to observe  that  savings  placed  with the  informal  sector  were
estimated  to account  for  about  50  per  cent.  of  net financial  savings  of the
household  sector  in  Cameroon  during  1983-84. The  researchers  estimated  that
this  provided  over  10  per  cent  of the  corporate  sector's  use  of funds,  and
over  25 per  cent  of their  financial  deficit.  In  Yugoslavia,  the  scale  of
trade  credit  seems  to  be much  higher  than  in  other  countries,  possibly
reflecting  the  socialist  organization  of production.  Furthermore  the
widespread  holding  of foreign-currency  denominated  deposits  has  had  a
significant  effect  on the  structure  of flows  in  Yugoslavia.
51TABLE 8S  nOW OF FUNDS FOR COMPOSITE COUNTRIES
XCGNP  Composite of six countries
Household  Business  General Government
Not  Ass  Liab  Net  Ass  Liab  Net  Ass  Llab
Currency and deposits  6.1  6.1  2.4  2.4  0.1  0.8  0.9  0.1
Securitles  1.1  1.2  0.1  -1.8  0.5  2.3  -0.8  0.1  0.9
EquLtles and stocks  1.8  1.8  -2.5  1.0  3.5  1.0  1.0
Loans  -3.6  3.6  -8.9  1.4  10.3  -3.1  1.1  4.2
Insurance and pension  1.6  1.6
Trade credit  -0.7  -0.1  0.6  0.6  2.3  1.7
Other  0.5  0.3  -0.2  -1.3  0.6  1.9  2.1  2.2  0.1
Total  6.7  10.9  4.2  -11.5  8.3  19.8  0.1  5.4  5.3
S GNP  Composite of eight  countrLes
Household  Buslness
Net  Ass  LLab  Net  Ass  LLb
Currency  and  deposits  9.3  9.3  2.8  2.9  0.2
SeouritLes  1.1  1.2  0.1  -1.2  0.6  1.8
Equities  and  stocks  1.0  1.0  -2.1  0.8  2.8
Loans  -3.7  0.0  3.7  -11.8  2.3  14.1
Insurance  and  pension  1.2  1.2
Trade  credit  -0.6  0.0  0.5  0.3  5.3  5.0
Other  0.4  0.2  -0.1  1.6  3.3  1.7
Total  8.7  12.9  4.2  -11.9  15.3  27.2
Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoir-e Ecuador, Korea, Portug-l, Thailand, Turkey and Yu6osLavia
Figures for goverr.mnt sector not avaLlable for Portugal or Yugoslavia.
52acquired  money  in an  amount  equivalent  to  6.1%  of GNP,  while  business
obtained  loans  in an  amount  equivalent  to  6.1%  of GNP.  Flows  within  the
financial  system  are  not shown,  but their  importance  is  hinted  at  by allowing
the  bubbles  representing  certain  instruments  to touch. The importance  of
money  and  loans  is  evident,  as is the  two-way  nature  of the  interaction  of
each  of the  sectors  with the  financial  system.
On the  basis  of the  cointries  that  have  been  examined,  a stylized  typical
structure  of flows  would  be:
- For  households,  gross  borrowing,  mainly  from  banks,  equivalent  to  about
one-quarter  of gross  lending. Some  two-thirds  of gross  lending  in the  form
of  bank  deposits,  the  remainder  primarily  distributed  between  life  insurance
and  pension  fund  reserves,  bonds  (government  or  corporate)  and  equities.
- For  the  business  sector,  gross  borrowing  equal  to  perhaps  twice  the  amount
of gross  lending. Trade  credit  an important  part  on  both sides. Loans
(including  loans  from  abroad)  forming  about  one-half  of gross  borrowing  and
thus  of the  same  order  of magnitude  as  net  borrowing). Bonds  and  equity
forming  about  ten  to twenty  per  cent  of gross  borrowing;  sometimes  less.
Some  average  ratios  may  be noted  from  the  composite:  gross  claims  on
insurance  funds  account  to  about  5  per  cent  of gross  household  acquisition  of
financial  assets,  the  figure  for  equities  is  about  9 per  cent. On average
households  acquired  about  six  times  as much  money  as equities. The  net
borrowing  by the  business  sector  through  loans  was  about  six  times  as great
as its  net issues  of equities.
In summary,  the  data  confirm  the  general  belief  that  banks  dominate  the
financial  system  and  that  loans  are  far  more  important  than  equities. It is
also  clear  that  both the  household  and  business  sector  have gross
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Fig.  9  Finaincial  Instruments  in  lioustIhold  atn Business  Flows
(Based  on  experience  of  six  developinig  counitries)
The  tigtare  shtuws  tle relative  size  of  annual  flows  into  and  out  of  each  of  the  six  types
of  financial  instruments  to  and  from  the  household  and  business  sectors. The  width  of
the  nrrows  indicates  the  size  of the  flows,  thus  households  acquired  money in  an  amount
equivalent  to  6.1%  of  GNP,  while  business  obtained  loans  in  an  amount  equivalent  to 10.3%
of GNPtransactions  far  in  excess  of their  net  position,  with the  household  sector's
borrowing  being  primarily  from  banks,  and  the  business  sector  acquiring  money
and  trade  credit  claims  on itself
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Flows  gf  funds  between  sectors, The savings  which  each  economic  sector  puts
aside  out  of its  income  each  year  may  be applied  to the  acquisition  of real
or financial  assets. A sector  which  acquires  real  assets  in  excess  of its
savings  has to sell  or issue  financial  assets. The  difference  between  a
sector's  net  saving  and  its  net  acquisition  of real  assets  is  referred  to  as
its  financial  surplus  or deficit,  or  more  simply  as its  borrowing  or lending.
Information  on the  borrowing  and  lending  of the  various  sectors  are  contained
in the  flow  of funds,  or financial  accounts,  statistics  which  are  available
for  most  of the  industrial  cour.tries,  and for  a small  number  of developing
countries.
A review  of these  statistics  for  seventeen  developing  countries  reveals  that
the  household  sector  is a  net lender  in almost  all  cases. The  business
sector  is  almost  always  a  net  borrower  sector. The  government  sector  is
sometimes  a net lender,  but  more  often  a  net  borrower,  while  the  opposite  is
true  for  the  foreign  sector.
Self  financing  ratios, Besides  comparing  the  sectoral  financial  surpluses  to
GNP, it is  of interest  to  know  what  proportion  of each  sector's  acquisition
of real  assets  is  financed  out  of its  own  saving. On average,  the  household
sector  saves  more  than  twice  the  amount  needed  to  finance  its  accumulation  of
real  assets;  the  remainder  being  lent  to  other  sectors.
The  ratio  for  the  business  sector  is the  most interesting.  Overall  about
one-half  of real  capital  formation  by business  is  externally  financed. This
would  be consistent  with  a picture  in  which  the  business  sector  continually
generates  worthwhile  investment  opportunities  in excess  of its  ability  to
56provide  finance  from  internal  sources. This  highlights  the  important  role
played  by the  financial  system  in  channeling  savings  from  the  household  to
the  business  sector.
There  is  some  evidence  that  households  in  economies  with  higher  per capita
income,  and  in those  which  trade  extensively  with the  rest  of the  world  tend
to  have  higher  financial  surpluses.
Use o  financial  instruments.  The flow  of investable  resources  from
households  to enterprises  takes  a  variety  of forms  and  uses  a  variety  of
instruments.  The  amount  of data  available  here is  very  limited. Common
features  of the  situation  in  most  of the  countries  which  have  been  examined
is  a high reliance  on bank  deposits  and  loans,  and  the  comparatively  small
role  of equity  finance. Trade  credit  is a  potentially  important  source  of
finance  for  the  corporate  sector,  though  the  flow  can  be negative.
Resuonsive  and  unresponsive  sectors. Analysis  of the  flows  in  developing
countries  suggest  that  the  foreign  sector  cannot  be relied  upon to  be a
passive  or residual  provider  of funds  to the  domestic  economy. Fluctuations
in the  provision  of foreign  funds,  i.e.  in the  current  account  deficit  of the
balance  of  payments  are  more  correlated  with private  sector  net  financial
surplus  or deficit  than  with that  of the  government.  Fluctuations  in the
financial  surplus  of government  can  also  constrain  the  net  borrowing  of funds
to the  business  scetor. In  particular,  a shortfall  in foreign  finance,  or  a
reduction  in  government  surplus,  appears  to  result  on  average  mainly  in  a
reduction  in the  corporate  sector  deficit,  mainly  achieved  through  lower
business  investment.  The  household  sector  surplus  responds  little. The
availability  of investable  funds  to  the  business  sector  is  highly  dependent
at  present  on government  finance  and  on the  vagaries  of the  international
capital  market.
57Concluding  remarks. For  the  past  five  or six  years,  and  prospectively,  the
volume  of external  flows  into  developing  countries  has  been and  will  probably
remain  quite  restricted.  What  lessons  may  be drawn  from  past experience  as
to the  likely  evolution  of financial  flows  and  financial  intermediation  in
the  years  ahead?
It  would  help if governments  became  net lenders  rather  than  net  borrowers.
Failing  that,  the  main  message  from  our  analysis  is that  the  business  sector
will  be increasingly  dependent  on a flow  of  household  savings  which  up to  now
has  not  been  very responsive  to the  financing  needs  generated  by business
sector  investment  opportunities.
A possible  cause  for  this  lack  of response  has  been the  relatively
undeveloped  and in  some  cases  repressed  nature  of the  financial  system
reflected  in the  heavy  reliance  on  bank intermediation.  In an environment  of
attenuated  external  inflows,  action  to  improve  the  ability  of the  financial
system  to  offer  a wider  range  of instruments  should  yield  substantial
benefits.
58APPEDIX TABLE  1:  SECTORAL  SURPLUSES  AS PERCENTAGE  OF  GNP
year Hhold  Busn  Govt Forgn  year Mhold  Busn  Govt  Forgn  year Hiold  Busn  Covt Forgn
ALgerl-  1982  5.6  -9.7  5.3  0.8  Ecuador  1980  8.7 -10.3  -3.9  5.2  Portugal  1977  8.2  -14.5  -4.7  9.5
1983  8.6  -22.4  5.2  0.8  1981  8.5  -6.0  -6.0  4.1  1978  12.6  -14.2  -7.1  5.9
1984  8.2  -11.3  1.5  0.3  1982  5.5  -8.8  -6.0  10.2  1979  17.8  -13.9  -6.3  1.9
1985  6.8  -14.9  4.5  -0.9  1983  3.9  -5.9  -0.9  3.5  1981  18.7  -21.7  -11.1  13.1
1984  0.6  -4.9  0.3  5.4
COroon  1980  3.3  -9.2  -0.1  6.0  1985  3.5  -4.6  1.7  1.3  Thailand  1981  8.4  -8.9  -3.8  7.2
1981  3.8  -11.1  1.3  6.0  1982  7.9  -4.6  -5.6  2.7
1982  3.7  -9.7  2.7  3.3  Indla  1970  3.4  -0.9  -3.9  1.4  1983  4.1  -6.1  -3.5  7.3
1983  4.1  -11.0  5.4  1.5  1971  3.6  -1.2  -4.5  2.1
1984  5.3  -6.2  3.9.  -3.0  1972  4.5  -1.1  -4.9  1.6  Tunisia  1Q77  1.4  -12.9  1.4  10.1
1973  6.2  -1.0  -5.1  -0.1  1980  1.0  -12.0  6.6  4.3
Chile  1983  2.9  -2.8  -5.0  5.0  1974  3.4  -1.8  -4.3  2.7  1981  2.4  -14.1  4.7  7.0
1984  3.3  -9.2  -4.5  10.3  1975  5.3  -1.5  -6.0  2.1  1982  2.5  -16.5  4.0  10.0
1985  4.8  -8.8  -3.5  7.5  1976  6.0  -0.2  -5.5  -0.3  1983  2.9  -15.7  3.6  9.2
1977  6.4  -1.1  -3.9  -1.4  1984  2.7  -14.4  3.5  8.1
China  1982  4.2  -1.7  -0.6  -1.9  1978  6.9  -0.7  -5.1  -1.2
1983  5.6  -3.6  -1.0  -1.0  1979  6.2  -1.0  -6.5  1.3  Turkey  1971  6.7  -6.9  1.0  0.1
1984  8.7  -8.4  -0.1  -0.2  1980  6.7  -1.1  -7.4  1.7  1972  7.1  -9.5  0.7  -0.3
1985  7.4  -13.6  1.9  4.3  1981  6.2  -1.6  -6.9  2.3  1973  8.7  -9.2  -0.4  -2.7
1986  9.2  -13.1  1.1  2.8  1982  7.0  -1.8  -7.1  1.9  1974  7.2  -12.2  -0.5  2.5
1975  7.3  -11.8  0.4  5.2
Colombia  1970  2.5  -5.9  -0.5  4.0  Indonesia  1982  3.6  -4.8  -6.8  6.0  1976  7.6  -10.3  -4.6  5.4
1971  1.3  -6.0  -1.6  6.3  1983  1.7  -3.5  -4.0  8.5  1977  9.2  -10.3  -2.5  7.8
'.0  1972  3.4  -4.0  -1.4  2.0  1984  3.2  -4.7  1.2  2.4  1978  8.2  -9.7  -3.9  3.3
1973  4.9  -2.6  -2.2  0.0  1985  3.4  -3.5  -0.6  2.4  1979  7.6  -10.1  -3.8  2.8
1974  3.0  -5.8  0.2  2.6  1986  3.2  -3.8  -4.6  5.7  1980  5.7  -16.5  2.6  6.5
1975  2.6  -4.6  2.1  -0.1  1981  9.6  -14.4  1.5  4.3
1976  3.0  -4.9  3.4  -1.5  Korea  1980  5.7  -17.1  1.3  9.4
1977  5.6  -4.0  1.3  -2.9  1981  7.0  -15.8  0.4  7.6  Yugoslavia  1970  2.7  -10.1  0.6  2.5
1978  4.3  -4.7  2.6  -2.2  1982  9.3  -13.8  0.4  5.7  1971  5.6  -8.9  -4.4  2.6
1979  4.2  -4.3  1.7  -1.6  1983  5.9  -10.4  1.5  3.4  1972  5.3  -5.9  0.1  -0.7
1980  4.2  -4.4  0.6  -0.5  1984  6.5  -11.3  1.7  2.8  1973  5.4  -3.7  0.7  -3.1
1981  3.4  -4.5  -2.6  3.8  1985  7.5  -11.6  1.5  2.1  1974  4.1  -6.4  -1.2  3.7
1982  3.9  -5.9  -3.5  5.5  1975  4.9  -9.5  -0.7  3.2
1983  3.5  -4.1  -4.7  3.3  MalaysLa  1980  11.7  3.1  -17.1  1.6  1976  5.4  -6.9  0.5  -0.5
1984  3.7  -4.5  -2.8  3.6  1985  18.5 -13.8  -8.1  2.4  1977  5.0  -10.6  -0.5  4.4
1985  3.2  -4  a  -0.6  2.1  1986  20.2 -10.8 -11.5  1.2  1978  6.9  -9.0  1.5  1.8
1986  3.6  -3.5  4.4  -4.5  1979  5.4  -10.8  1.8  5.6
Philippines  1983  13.4 -13.8  -7.5  7.1  1980  6.0  -9.0  0.5  3.7
Cote  d'Ivoire  1971  2.0  -4.0  -3.1  4.1  1984  0.6  2.6  -4.4  2.7  1981  6.0  -6.7  2.3  0.9
1972  1.7  -4.9  -0.7  3.0  1985  13.3  -9.7  1.0  -1.1  1982  8.4  -4.1  1.9  0.2
1973  1.5  -7.2  0.3  3.9  1983  13.4  -7.4  1.4  -1.0
1974  2.7  -7.9  4.5  0.5  1984  11.3  -9.5  3.0  -1.9
1975  1.3  -5.4  -4.6  8.4  1985  16.5  -13.3  3.6  -2.4
1976  1.4  -8.9  4.7  0
1977  -0.3  -13.6  11.4  2.0
1978  1.4  -10.0  -2.1  10.4APPERDIX TABLE 2: SECTOR SELF-FINANCING  RATIOS,  VARIOUS COUNTRIES
Hholds  Busineso  Govt  Hholds  Business  Govt  Mwolds  Business  Govt
Cameroon  1980  18.72  0.48  0.99  Ecuador  1980  2.42  0.26  0.54  Thailand  1981  3.58  0.49  0.17
1981  14.54  0.49  1.22  1981  2.63  0.35  0.47  1982  3.24  0.65  -0.18
1982  9.01  0.46  1.45  1982  1.70  0.26  0.38  1983  2.00  0.60  0.14
1983  9.20  0.43  2.04  1983  1.84  0.35  0.89  Avg  2.94  0.58  0.04
1984  9.50  0.63  1.60  1984  0.97  0.48  1.19
Avg  10.16  0.41  1.22  19S5  1.72  0.49  1.45  TunLsia  1977  1.31  0.37  1.25
Avg  1.88  0.36  0.70  1980  1.20  0.36  2.43
China  1982  2.16  0.91  0.91  1981  1.56  0.34  1.92
1983  2.20  0.80  0.85  India  1970  1.39  0.64  0.45  1982  1.60  0.26  1.75
1984  2.44  0.56  0.98  1971  1.40  0.59  0.40  1983  1.67  0.22  1.67
1985  2.15  0.50  1.37  1972  1.60  0.59  0.36  1984  1.68  0.26  1.71
1986  2.33  0.51  1.22  1973  1.74  0.65  0.38  Avg  1.50  0.30  1.79
Avg  2.26  0.63  1.07  1974  1.39  0.53  0.47
1975  1.60  0.49  0.43  Turkey  1971  2.95  0.44  1.20
Colombia  1970  1.52  0.46  1.00  1976  1.61  0.87  0.49  1972  3.26  0.17  1.19
1971  1.30  0.47  0.63  1977  1.67  0.57  0.54  1973  3.25  0.26  0.89
1972  1.58  0.55  0.63  1978  1.62  0.72  0.49  1974  3.20  0.13  0.91
1973  1.89  0.66  0.52  1979  1.60  0.68  0.42  1975  2.94  0.12  1.07
1974  1.43  0.49  1.15  1980  1.64  0.65  0.33  1976  2.85  0.25  0.27
1975  1.42  0.47  2.05  1981  1.67  0.54  0.42  1977  3.27  0.38  0.71
1976  1.53  0.49  2.31  1982  1.79  0.52  0.41  1978  3.13  0.44  0.41
1977  2.20  0.54  1.29  Avg  1.59  0.62  0.43  1979  2.82  0.25  0.29
O  1978  1.80  0.49  1.75  1980  2.12  O.OS  1.47
1979  1.75  0.56  1.73  Korea  1980  1.52  0.30  1.20  1981  4.08  0.09  1.26
1980  1.81  0.54  1.29  1981  1.98  0.34  1.32  Avg  3.08  0.23  0.88
1981  1.64  0.53  0.58  1982  3.26  0.42  1.34
1982  1.65  0.46  0.34  1983  1.84  0.52  1.55
1983  1.62  0.55  0.01  1984  1.73  0.52  1.47  YugoslavLa  1970  1.38  0.65  1.16
1984  1.75  0.55  0.32  Avg  2.07  0.42  1.38  1971  1.86  0.66  0.49
1985  1.71  0.57  1.10  1972  1.80  0.74  1.03
1986  1.73  0.70  3.65  Malaysia  1980  5.00  1.18  -0.42  1973  1.75  0.84  1.18
Avg  1.67  0.53  1.20  1985  6.54  0.20  0.19  1974  1.57  0.79  0.79
1986  9.31  0.  24  -0.03  1975  1.64  0.69  0.88
Cote d'Ivolre 1971  1.66  0.63  0.56  Avg  6.95  0.54  -0.08  1976  1.67  0.74  1.08
1972  1.54  0.54  0.81  1977  1.71  0.66  0.89
1973  1.46  0.43  1.17  Phillipines 1983  -5.49  0.28  0.24  1978  1.93  0.71  1.32
1974  1.53  0.44  1.66  1984  1.08  3.13  0.53  1979  1.75  0.67  1.36
1975  1.36  0.46  0.49  1985  -3.50  0.07  1.20  198..  1.82  0.74  1.10
1976  1.46  0.16  1.46  1986  9.28  0.57  0.01  1981  2.02  0.79  1.58
1977  0.86  0.05  2.03  Avg  0.34  1.01  0.49  i982  2.52  0.86  1.47
1978  1.53  0.24  0.90  1983  3.32  0.77  1.44
Avg  1.42  0.37  1.13  PortugaL  1977  1.77  0.01  -0.09  1984  2.92  0.73  1.98
1978  2.13  0.09  -0.70  1985  4.08  0.64  2.96
1979  2.79  0.09  -0.37  Avg  2.11  0.73  1.29
1980  2.85  0.06  -0.58
1981  2.72  -0.15  -0.88
Avg  2.45  0.02  -0.52APPENIUX TABLE  3:  SAVING AND INVESTMENT  - HOUSEIOLD AID  BUSINESS  SECTORS
Selected  countries
2  GNP  INVESTKENT  SAVING  INVESTlENT  SAVING  INVESTMENT  SAVING
Uholds  Busn  8holds  Busn  Eholds  Busan  Molds  Busn  Hholds  Busn  Sholds  Busn
Cameroon  1980  0.18  17.53  3.45  8.34  Ecuador  1980  5.56  13.85  13.45  3.55  Thailand  1981  '  24  17.27  11.62  8.40
1981  0.28  21.83  4.05  10.77  1981  4.63  10.77  12.17  3.75  1982  3.50  13.14  11.36  8.56
1982  0.46  18.05  4.13  8.34  1982  6.06  12.89  10.32  3.35  1983  4.11  15.15  8.22  9.04
1983  0.50  19.20  4.57  8.23  1983  3.97  8.54  7.33  3.03
1984  0.63  16.70  5.95  10.45  1984  4.63  9.36  4.50  4.53  TunIsia  1977  4.50  20.50  5.90  7.60
1980  4.90  18.80  5.90  6.80
Chlna  1982  3.59  19.37  7.76  17.65  India  1970  8.76  2.58  12.19  1.64  1981  4.30  21.50  6.70  7.40
1983  4.64  18.07  10.20  14.52  1971  9.08  2.99  12.69  1.75  1982  4.20  22.40  6.70  5.90
1984  6.05  19.30  14.76  10.89  1972  7.40  2.80  11.88  1.65  1983  4.30  20.00  7.20  4.30
1985  6.44  26.99  13.82  13.39  1973  8.38  2.78  14.54  1.81  1984  4.00  19.40  6.80  5.00
1986  6.92  26.91  16.14  13.81  1974  8.89  3.91  12.32  2.08
1975  8.85  2.90  14.16  1.43  Turkey  1971  3.44  12.38  10.17  5.44
Colombia  1970  4.79  12.05  7.26  5.56  1976  9.79  1.62  15.79  1.41  1972  3.13  11.41  10.20  1.95
1971  4.00  11.95  5.19  5.64  1977  9.56  2.62  15.97  1.49  1973  3.85  12.36  12.50  3.17
1972  5.72  9.50  9.01  5.23  1978  11.24  2.30  18.16  1.65  1974  3.27  13.92  10.46  1.77
1973  5.50  8.07  10.42  5.29  1979  10.25  3.07  16.42  2.09  1975  3.85  13.43  11.34  1.63
1974  6.62  11.48  9.46  5.61  1980  10.53  3.08  17.24  1.99  1976  4.10  13.67  11.68  3.35
1975  5.72  8.89  8.11  4.16  1981  9.16  3.50  15.33  1.89  1977  4.04  16.69  13.22  6.37
1976  5.28  9.69  8.09  4.76  1982  8.83  3.68  15.81  1.92  1978  3.85  17.32  12.06  7.59
1977  4.57  8.95  10.08  4.83  1979  4.18  13.43  11.81  3.29
1978  5.05  9.23  9.08  4.56  Korea  1980  6.09  20.93  9.26  6.20  1980  5.13  17.39  10.87  0.88
0A  1979  5.39  9.84  9.46  5.50  1981  4.86  20.49  9.65  6.94  1981  3.11  15.80  12.70  1.45
1980  5.00  10.01  9.05  5.44  1982  3.04  19.85  9.94  8.26
1981  4.96  10.50  8.14  5.51  1983  5.56  19.14  10.25  10.04  Yugoslavia  1970  7.25  28.82  9.98  18.65
1982  5.05  11.08  8.31  5.08  1984  7.08  19.47  12.25  10.07  1971  6.50  26.45  12.12  17.51
1983  5.42  9.75  8.79  5.35  1972  6.64  22.25  11.97  16.37
1984  4.92  10.82  8.63  5.91  Malaysia  1980  2.92  17.32  14.59  20.43  1973  7.18  22.59  12.58  18.93
1985  4.40  12.73  7.53  7.21  1985  3.34  17.27  21.87  3.48  1974  7.17  30.94  11.29  24.53
1986  4.80  12.93  8.30  9.11  1986  2.43  14.26  22.61  3.49  1975  7.75  29.52  12.71  20.07
1976  8.10  26.65  13.52  19.76
Cote  dlivoire 1971  3.06  11.52  5.09  7.23  Philipplnes  1983  -2.06  19.04  11.30  5.28  1977  7.00  31.20  11.99  20.59
1972  3.27  11.50  5.03  6.21  1984  7.91  1.21  8.51  3.79  1978  7.36  30.80  14.22  21.76
1973  3.07  13.35  *.46  5.83  1985  -2.94  10.46  10.31  0.76  1979  7.12  33.04  12.47  22.29
1974  3.34  12.48  5.09  5.50  1986  2.85  -16.33  26.44  -9.38  1980  7.34  35.20  13.38  26.14
1975  3.47  9.97  *.73  4.55  1981  5.89  32.07  11.88  25.31
1976  2.98  10.77  4.35  1.84  Portugal  1977  10.26  15.76  18.16  0.15  1982  5.49  29.89  13.85  25.77
1977  2.42  14.46  2.08  0.90  1978  10.78  16.64  23.02  1.52  1983  5.76  32.90  19.14  25.46
1978  2  74  13.97  4.19  4.00  1979  9.60  15.90  26.82  1.45  1984  5.90  35.48  17.20  25.99
1980  9.60  19.12  27.36  1.18  1985  5.37  36.84  21.90  23.57
1981  10.46  19.42  28.48  -2.92APPENDIX  TASLE  4:  DATA FOR  A FEW INDUSTRIAL  COUNTRIES
SECTORAL SURPLUSES  SELF-FINANCING  RATIOS
I of  GIP
Ehold  Business  Govt  Fore4gn  Hhold  Buwlness  Govt
France  1980  3.24  -4.95  0.21  1.43  1.40  0.59  1.21
1981  4.41  -4.22  -1.78  1.50  1.59  0.58  0.49
1982  4.66  -5.14  -2.72  3.09  1.64  0.52  0.26
Avg  4.11  -4.77  -1.43  2.01  1.54  0.56  0.65
Italy  1981  13.18  -3.59  -11.94  2.31  2.54  0.57  -1.81
1982  13.86  -2.81  -12.70  1.59  2.81  0.61  -1.80
1983  14.70  -2.07  -11.82  -0.22  3.43  0.61  -1.49
Avg  13.92  -2.82  -12.15  1.23  2.93  0.60  -1.70
Japan  1983  9.14  -4.22  -3.66  -1.77  2.13  0.70  0.54
1984  8.91  -4.53  -2.09  -2.80  2.20  0.70  0.77
1985  9.42  -5.43  -0.84  -3.63  2.21  0.69  1.03
Avg  9.16  -4.73  -2.20  -2.73  2.18  0.70  0.78
Unlted  KiLgdom  1982  4.65  -0.09  -2.70  -1.23  1.98  0.91  0.04
1983  3.32  1.35  -3.63  -0.72  1.57  1.10  -0.32
1984  3.57  1.40  -3.82  0.30  1.60  1.11  -0.44
Avg  3.84  0.89  -3.38  -0.55  1.72  1.04  -0.24
Average  8.28  -3.73  *3.79  -0.91  2.12  0.70  0.23
FLOW OF  F0NDS  FOR CW4POSITE  COUNTRIES'
Household  Buslness  General  Government
Net  Ass  Liab  met  Ass  Liab  Net  Ass  LLab
Currency  and  deposits  7.3  7.3  2.6  2.6  0.6  0.6
SecurLtLes  2.4  2.4  -0.8  0.3  1.1  -4.8  0.4  5.2
Equities  and  stocks  0.1  0.1  -0.5  0.5  1.0  0.4  0.4
Loans  -3.3  3.4  -6.5  0.3  6.8  -0.7  0.9  1.5
Insurance  and pension  funds  2.4  2.4  -0.1  0.1
Trade  credit  -0.5  0.5  0.5  1.5  1.0
Other  (incl  forex)  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.5  0.2  1.0  1.2  0.1
TotcL  8.7  12.6  3.9  -4.6  5.7  10.3  -4.0  3.4  7.4
*France,  Italy,  Japan  and Unlted  Kingdom.ANNEX
Al.  This  part  of the  annex  presents  a somewhat  technical  argument  in  support
of the  assertion  in the  text  (Section  3.2)  that  barriers  to international
capital  mobility  can  result  in  serious  efficiency  losses  if  the  domestic
capital  market  is imperfect.
The  underlying  argument  is  displayed  in figure  Al:  panel  A displays  the
domestic  supply'(s)  and  demand  (D)  schedules  for  loanable  funds,  as a
function  of the  rate  of return  to  the  saver. With a  perfectly  functioning
international  capital  market  defining  the  world  supply  price  of capital  at r,
the  use  of loanable  funds  is  OF, the  net import  of capital  is  EF 5 . This  is
the  efficient  outcome  against  which  other  situations  may  be evaluated. If
the  international  capital  market  is  closed,  then  the  outcome  is  at the
intersection  of supply  and  demand  curves,  leading  to the  welfare  loss  shaded
in the  figure. The  second  panel  proposes  some  inefficiency  in  the  domestic
capital  and financial  markets  having  the  net  effect  of impeding  the  ability
of  borrowers  to  pass  through  the  full  marginal  return  of  capital  to the
Providers  of funds 52. The inefficiency  has the  effect  of placing  a wedge
between  the  retutn  on capital  and the  return  to  the  saver 53.  The size  of the
wedge  is illustrated  by  the  gap  between  the  demand  curve  and the
"after-wedge"  curve,  which  represent  the  perceived  return  to  domestic
lenders.
If the  international  capital  market  is  open  and,  despite  the  inefficiency  of
the  domestic  financial  system,  is  able  and  willing  to  provide  loanable  funds
at the  world  supply  price  of  capital  r,,  no welfare  loss  results  from  the
inability  of the  domestic  financial  market  to intermediate  efficiently.  The
domestic  savers  will  be able  to  obtain  rW 54, and  the  domestic  borrowers  will
borrow  at the  same  rate 55. (The  net  borrowing  of domestic  sectors  from  abroad
would  in this  case  be lower  than  gross  business  borrowing). However,  if the
international  capital  market  is  closed,  the  welfare  loss  will  be  much  higher
than in  panel  A: expanding  to  the  whole  of the  shaded  area in  panel  B.
51 It is possible  that  gross  borrowing  from  abroad  will  exceed  EF,  with  a
capital  outflow  from  savers  being  matched  by additional  borrowing.
52  Some  reasons  why the  financial  markets  in  developing  countries  cannot
provide  the  necessary  risk  diversification  are  mentioned  in  Section  3.3.
53  Return  should  be interpreted  here as  a summary  of  a multidimensional
concept  involving  mean return,  risk  pattern  and  time-path.
54  Once  again  the  diagrams  only  reveal  the  net  capital  flows. The  degree  to
which  the  rest  of the  world  provides  intermediation  services  would  presumably
be greater  in this  case  of a  wedge. It  has  to  be recognized  that  this
two-dimensional  diagram  is  attempting  to  capture  a  complex  multidimensional
reality. The  exact  mix of domestic  and  foreign  financing,  equity  and  bonds
or bank  borrowing,  and  so forth,  would  all  need  to  be determined  in a  more
complete  description  of the  interaction  of the  various  sectoral  surpluses.
55 It  may  reasonably  be asked  why  the  foreign  sector  is  modeled  as  being  able
to effect  a perfect  intermediation  so that  it  can  provide  funds  even  for
projects  yielding  no more  than  the  world  supply  price  of capital. Of course
this  is  an exaggeration.  Panel  C sbows  what  may  be a  more realistic
intermediate  case  where  the  supply  price  of loanable  funds  increases  with
quantity,  reflecting  the  fact  that  for  some  proj  ects  it  may  be difficult
even  for  the  foreign  sector  to  provide  perfect  intermediation.  The
qualitative  arguments  remain  valid  in  this  case.
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A:  Effect  of  opening  international  flows  B:  Effect  of  imnroving  efficiencv  C:  Possible  inefficiencv  of
(shaded  area  indicates  potential  pain)  of  domestic  financial  riarket  international  flowsThis  analysis  is  based  on the  assumption  that  the  foreign  lenders  can  escape
some of the  inefficiency  suffered  by the  domestic  financial  markets. This
could  easily  be the  case  as a  result  of  policies  such  as interest  rate
controls  creating  financial  repression  at  home,  but  not  affecting  the  foreign
lender. It  could  also  result  from  the  much  greater  possibilities  of risk
diversification  and  management  open  to foreign  financial  institutions.
The  analysis  suggests  both the  important  role  played  by foreign
intermediation  In  achieving  investment  efficiency  and  the  need for  policies
to improve  the  efficiency  of domestic  intermediation  when foreign  flows  do
not  flow  smoothly  in  response  to  yield  differentials.
A2.  This  part of the  annex  illustrates  the  traditional  account  of the
welfare  improvement  achieved  by financial  markets  smoothing  intertemporal
consumption  streams. Reference  is to figure  A2.
A subsistence  economy  provides  a steady  but  modest  flow  of consumption  to
each  household  allowing  it  to reach  point  A in the  figure. An investment
opportunity  is open  to  one  household,  which  could  become  an entrepreneur.
This investment  opportunity  absorbs  some  resources  now  but  yields  a  return
later. As shown  by point  B in  the  figure  being  inside  the  indifference
curve,  the  net  consumption  stream  made  possible  by the  investment  opportunity
is too  uneven  over  time  to  be attractive  to  the  potential  entrepreneur.  But
by incorporating  his  enterprise,  and  selling  shares,  the  entrepreneur  can
achieve  some  point  on the  line  AB,  making  him  better  off,  and  the  purchasers
of the  shares  at least  no  worse  off.







Algeria,  Cameroon,  China,  Colombia,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Tunisia:  World  Bank
files.
Cote  d'Ivoire:  Les  ComRtes  de la  Naticn  (various  years),  Republique  de Cote
Dl'voire,  Ministere  de 1'Economie,  des  Finances  et du  Plan,  Abidjan.
Ecuador,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  Portugal,  United  Kingdom:  National  Accounts
Statistics:  Main  Aggregates  and  Detailed  Tables.  1985,  United  Nations,  New
York,  1987.
India:  ReRort  to the  Committee  to  Review  the  Working  of the  Monetary  System,
Reserve  Bank  of India,  Bombay,  1985.
Korea:  Economic  Statistics  Yearbook,  Bank  of  Korea,  1986.
Philippines:  Annual  Report  (various  years),Central  Bank  of the  Philippines,
Manila  and  World  Bank  files.
Thailand:  Flow  of Funds  Accounts  of  Thailand,  National  Accounts  Division,
Office  of the  National  Economic  and  Social  Development  Board,  1986.
Turkey:  Akyuz,  Y. Financial  Structure  and  Relations  in  the  Turkish  Economy,
Istanbul,  1984.
Yugoslavia:  Ouarterly  Bulletin,  National  Bank  of  Yugoslavia,  Belgrade,  various
issues.
67PPR  Working  Paper  Series
Title  Author  Date  Contact
WPS143 Decentralization  In  Education:
An Economic  Perspective  Donald  R.  Winkler
WPS144 Product  Differentiation  and  the
Treatment  of Foreign  Trade In
CGE Models  of Small  Economies  Jalme  de  Melo  February  1989  K.  Cabana
Sherman  Robinson  61539
WPS145 Revenue  Raising  Taxes: General
Equilibrium  Evaluation  of  Alternative
Taxation  In  U.S.  Petroleum  Industries  Jalme  de  Melo  February  1989  K.  Cabana
Julie  Stanton  61539
David  Tarr
WPS146 Exchange  Rate-Based  Disinflation,  Wage
Rigidity,  and  Capital  Inflows:
Tradeoffs  for  Chile  1977-81  Timothy  Condon  February  1989  K.  Cabana
Vittorlo  Corbo  61539
Jaime  de  Melo
WPS147 The  Private  Sector's  Response  to
Financial  Liberalization  In  Turkey:
1980-82  Izak  Atlyas  January  1989  W. Pltayatonakarn
60353
WPS148  Impact  of the International  Coffee
Agreement's  Export  Quota  System  on the
World  Coffee  Market  Takamasa  Aklyama  February  1989  D.  Gustafson
Panayotis  N. Varangis  33714
WPS149 Reflections  on  Perestroyka  and  the
Foreign  Economic  Ties  of the  USSR  Bela  Balassa  January  1989  N.  Campbell
33769
WPS150  Improving  the  Currency  Composition
of External  Debt: Applications  In
Indonesia  and  Turkey  Ken  Kroner  January  1989  L.  Chavarria
StlJn  Claessens  33730
WPS151 U.S.  Trade  Policy  Towards
Developing  Countries  Bela  Balassa  January  1989  N.  Campbell
33769
WPS152 Subsidies  and  Countervailing  Measures:
Economic  Considerations  Bela  Balassa  January  1989  N.  Campbell
33769PPR  Working  Paper  Series
Title  Author  Date  Contact
WPS153 An Analysis  of  Debt  Reduction  Schemes
Initiated  by  Debtor  Countries  Ishac  Diwan
StlJn  Claessens
WPS154 Forecasting,  Uncertainty  and  Public
Project  Appraisal  Jock  R.  Anderson  February  1989  A.  Kitson-Walters
33712
WPS155 Measuring  Adult  Mortality  In
Developing  Countries: A  Review  and
Assessment  of Methods  Ian  Timaeus
Wendy  Graham
WPS156 Experience  with  Credit  Cooperatives
In  Israeli  Agriculture  Yoav  Kislev
Zvi  Lerman
Pinhas  Zusman
WPS157 A Policy  Model  for  Tunisia  with
Real  and  Financial  Flows  Martha  de  Melo  January  1989  A.  Bhalia
Marc  Leduc  60359
Setareh  Razmara
WPS158 Labor  Redundancy  In  the  Transport
Sector  Alice  Galenson  February  1989  W. Wright
33744
WPS159 Current  International  Gas Trades
and  Prices  Kay  McKeough  March  1989  M. Fernandez
33637
WPS160 Evaluating  the  Performance  of Public
Enterprises  In  Pakistan  Mary  M. Shirley
WPS161 The  Role  of  Conmodity  Indexed  Debt
In International  Lending  Timothy  Eesley
Andrew  Powell
WPS162 Ups and  Doewns  In Inflation:  Argentina
Since  the  Austral  Plan  Miguel  A.  Kiguel
WPS163 The Impact  of Infrastructure  and
Financial  Institutions  on Agricultural
Output  and Investment  In  India  Hans  P.  Binswanger
Shahidur  R.  Khandker
Mark  R.  Rosenzweig
WPS164  Intersectoral  Financial  Flows  in
Developing  Countries  Patrick  Honohan  March  1989  W. Pitayatonakarn
Izak  Atlyas  60353